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MORE THAN ZERO: ACCOUNTING FOR
ERROR IN LATENT FINGERPRINT
IDENTIFICATION
SIMON A. COLE*
LOUISE: I never would have guessed that he was selling fake insurance.
CANEWELL: That's what the whole idea was.., he didn't want you to guess it. If
you could have guessed, then he couldn't have sold nobody no insurance.
- August Wilson, Seven Guitars (1996)
INTRODUCTION
The year 2004 witnessed what was probably the most highly
publicized fingerprint error ever exposed: the case of Brandon Mayfield, an
Oregon attorney and Muslim convert who was held for two weeks as a
material witness in the Madrid bombing of March 11, 2004, a terrorist
attack in which 191 people were killed. Mayfield, who claimed not to have
left the United States in ten years and did not have a passport, was
implicated in this attack almost solely on the basis of a latent fingerprint
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of these acknowledgments should be interpreted as an endorsement of the opinions in this
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found on a bag in Madrid containing detonators and explosives in the
aftermath of the bombing. Unable to identify the source of the print, the
Spanish National Police emailed it to other police agencies. Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) Senior Fingerprint Examiner Terry Green identified
Mayfield as the source of the latent print.' Mayfield's print was in the
database because of a 1984 arrest for burglary and because of his military
service. The government's affidavit stated that Green "considers the match
to be a 100% identification" of Mayfield.2 Green's identification was
"verified" by Supervisory Fingerprint Specialist Michael Wieners, Unit
Chief, Latent Print Unit and fingerprint examiner John T. Massey, a retired
FBI fingerprint examiner with over thirty years of experience.
Kenneth Moses, a well-known independent fingerprint examiner
widely considered a leader in the profession, subsequently testified in a
closed hearing that, although the comparison was "quite difficult," the
Madrid print "is the left index finger of Mr. Mayfield.' '3 A few weeks later
the FBI retracted the identification altogether and issued a rare apology to
Mayfield.4 The Spanish National Police had attributed the latent print to
Ouhnane Daoud, an Algerian national living in Spain.
The error occurred at a time when the accuracy of latent print
identification has been subject to intense debate. Because the Mayfield case
is the first publicly exposed case of an error committed by an FBI latent
print examiner and the examiners were highly qualified, it was particularly
sensational.
But the Mayfield case was not the first high-profile fingerprint
misattribution to be exposed in 2004.5 In January, Stephan Cowans was
1 Application for Material Witness Order and Warrant Regarding Witness: Brandon Bieri
Mayfield, In re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings 03-01, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Or. 2004)
(No. 04-MC-9071).
2 Id.
3 Les Zaitz, Transcripts Detail Objections, Early Signs of Flaws, OREGONIAN, May 26,
2004, at Al; Noelle Crombie & Les Zaitz, FBIApologizes to Mayfield, OREGONIAN, May 25,
2004, at 1; Andrew Kramer, Fingerprint Science Not Exact, Experts Say, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 21, 2004, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5032168; see also Steven T. Wax
& Christopher J. Schatz, A Multitude of Errors: The Brandon Mayfield Case, 28 CHAMPION
6 (2004). There is some ambiguity as to whether Moses was retained by Mayfield or by the
court. Moses's retention was apparently proposed by Mayfield, but Moses was then
appointed by the court so that his report would go directly to the court. Electronic
communication from Les Zaitz, Reporter, The Oregonian, to author (Sept. 7, 2004) (on file
with the author). In any case, it is clear that Moses's role was to provide an independent
assessment of the evidence.
4 Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement on Brandon Mayfield Case,
(May 24, 2004) [hereinafter FBI Press Release].
5 See Jonathan Saltzman & Mac Daniel, Man Freed in 1997 Shooting of Officer: Judge
Gives Ruling After Fingerprint Revelation, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2004, at Al.
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freed after serving six and a half years of a 30- to 45-year sentence for
shooting and wounding a police officer.6  Cowans had been convicted
solely on fingerprint and eyewitness evidence, but post-conviction DNA
testing showed that Cowans was not the perpetrator.7 The Boston Police
Department then admitted that the fingerprint evidence was erroneous,8
making Cowans the first person to be convicted by fingerprint evidence and
exonerated by DNA evidence. 9 As with the Mayfield case, the Cowans
misattribution involved multiple experts, including defense experts.10
Latent print examiners have long claimed that fingerprint identification
is "infallible." 1' The claim is widely believed by the general public, as
evidenced by the publicity generated by the Mayfield and Cowans cases,
with newspaper headlines like "Despite Its Reputation, Fingerprint
Evidence Isn't Really Infallible.' 12 Curiously, the claim even appears to
survive exposed cases of error, which would seem to puncture the claim of
infallibility.'" Such cases have been known since as early as 1920 and have
not disturbed the myth of infallibility.' 4  Today, latent print examiners
continue to defend the claim of infallibility, even in the wake of the
Mayfield case.' 5 For example, Agent Massey commented in a story on the
Mayfield case, "I'll preach fingerprints till I die. They're infallible. 16
Another examiner declared, in a discussion of the Mayfield case,





9 The Innocence Project, at http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited May 8, 2005).
10 David Weber & Kevin Rothstein, Man Freed After 6 Years: Evidence Was Flawed,
BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 24, 2004, at 4.
11 See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE SCIENCE OF FINGERPRINTS:
CLASSIFICATION AND USES, at iv (1985) ("Of all the methods of identification, fingerprinting
alone has proved to be both infallible and feasible.").
12 Sharon Begley, Despite Its Reputation, Fingerprint Evidence Isn't Really Infallible,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 4, 2004 at B 1; Simon A. Cole, Fingerprints Not Infallible, 26
NAT'L L.J. 22 (Feb. 23, 2004); Kramer, supra note 3.
13 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Loomis, 113 A. 428, 430 (Pa. 1921).
14 Id; Commonwealth v. Loomis, 110 A. 257 (Pa. 1920); Albert S. Osborn, Proof of
Finger-Prints, 26 AM. INST. CRAM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 587 (1935).
15 See, e.g., Flynn McRoberts et al., Forensics Under the Microscope, CHI. TaM., Oct.
17,2004, at 1.
16 Id.
17 Steve Scarborough, They Keep Putting Fingerprints in Print, WEEKLY DETAIL, Dec.
13, 2004, available at http://www.clpex.com/Articles/TheDetail/100-199/TheDetaill74.htm.
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The question of the "error rate" of forensic fingerprint identification
has become a topic of considerable legal debate in recent years. "Error
rate" has been enshrined as one of the non-definitive criteria for admissible
scientific evidence under the United States Supreme Court's decision
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. 18 In discussing how trial judges
should exercise their "gatekeeping" responsibility to ensure that "any and
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable," 19 the Court noted that "in, the case of a particular scientific
technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate
of error., 20  In Kumho Tire v. Carmichael,21 the Court decided that the
" 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
'9 Id. at 589.
20 Id. at 594. The Court's phrasing of its "error rate" requirement was admittedly rather
vague. Part of the confusion probably stems from its use by the Daubert Court to demarcate
reliable from unreliable science. Id. at 589. In most scientific pursuits, the term "error"
usually refers to measurement error, the expected discrepancy between measured values and
true values. This is something quite different from an error rate. Since Daubert is
commonly read as an effort to describe what is distinctive about science, see, e.g., David S.
Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?: The Paradox of Expertise and
Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 685, 735-41 (2000), it might
have made more sense for the Court to have referred to measurement error than to "error
rate."
An error rate would tend to be more commonly associated with a process or technique.
A litmus test is an obvious example. Litmus paper turns red when exposed to an acid. One
might imagine calculating an error rate for different kinds of litmus paper by measuring how
often they fail to turn red when exposed to an acid and how often they turn red when
exposed to a substance that is not an acid. A pregnancy test might also be imagined to have
an error rate. And birth control devices often have "failure rates" associated with them,
although these are obviously highly sensitive to conditions of use.
There is, therefore, some potential confusion in the Court's use of "error rate" as one
of its criteria for defining legitimate scientific knowledge. Some knowledge claims
produced by areas of inquiry that most people would certainly consider "science," such as
physics, would be hard-pressed to provide an "error rate" for their findings, or even to
understand what would be meant by such a request. They would, on the other hand, readily
understand what was meant by a request for their "measurement error." On the other hand,
there are technical processes, like the production of "reliable" litmus paper (as opposed to
the chemical principle underlying litmus paper), that could readily comply with a request for
an "error rate," but would appear to most observers to be industrial production processes,
rather than "science."
As it happens, forensic identification much more closely resembles a technical process
than it does an open-ended search for knowledge, like a physics experiment. Forensic
identification is a routine, repetitive procedure that yields, not new knowledge, but one of a
prescribed set of possible results. As mentioned infra, Kumho Tire applies the Daubert
factors, including error rate, to such technical processes that generate expert evidence. The
results of such processes are either correct or incorrect, though it may not ever be possible to
determine this. Forensic identification techniques, therefore, seem readily amenable to the
estimation of error rate, the rate at which it yields correct results.
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"gatekeeping" responsibility extended to non-scientific expert evidence and
reiterated the same non-definitive checklist it enumerated in Daubert.
22
Though courts have found that latent print identification is non-scientific
expert evidence, Kumho prevents such a determination from becoming a
loophole through which latent print identification could evade Daubert's
requirement that judges ensure its reliability. Indeed, the Court specifically
noted that even the case of "experience-based" testimony-which,
presumably, is what latent print identification is, if it is not science-it is
relevant to know the error rate.23 Although the Supreme Court was careful
to note that its proposed checklist was merely illustrative, courts frequently
treat it as a defacto litmus test for admissibility. Since criminal defendants
began challenging the admissibility of forensic fingerprint evidence in
1999,24 the error rate of fingerprint evidence has been extensively discussed
and litigated.
2' 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
22 Id. at 141-42.
23 Id. at 151.
At the same time, and contrary to the Court of Appeals' view, some of Daubert's questions can
help to evaluate the reliability even of experience-based testimony. In certain cases, it will be
appropriate for the trial judge to ask, for example, how often an engineering expert's experience-
based methodology has produced erroneous results ....
Id.
Professors Denbeaux and Risinger have pointed out that discussions of "error rate" in
debates over applying the Daubert/Kumho standard to forensic science tend to ignore the
requirement in Kumho Tire that the discussion be calibrated to the task at hand. Mark
Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: How the Question
You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 15 (2003). While forensic
document examination (Denbeaux and Risinger's principal example) involves a greater
range of tasks than latent print identification, the tasks involved in latent print identification
do vary greatly. The principal axis of variation for latent print identification concerns the
difficulty of the comparison, and the principal component of this is the quality and quantity
of information available in the unknown print. Common sense indicates that the "error rate"
for very high quality latent prints (or very "easy" comparisons) should be quite different
from the "error rate" for marginal latent prints (or very "difficult" comparisons). A rational
attempt to assess the error rate of latent print identification should therefore yield not a single
"error rate," but many error rates, or, rather, an "error curve" showing the estimated rate of
error for different levels of latent print quality and quantity (or comparison difficulty). One
key hindrance to generating this sort of information is the lack of an accepted metric for
measuring either latent print quality and/or quantity or the difficulty of a comparison. So far,
the only possible metric is the number of ridge characteristics in a print, which has been,
with some justification, rejected as a metric by the latent print community, as being
inconsistent and not derived from empirical research. Christophe Champod, Edmond Locard
-Numerical Standards and 'Probable' Identifications, 45 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 136
(1995).
24 United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004).
SIMON A. COLE
Curiously, it would appear that the Court's inclusion of error rate in
Daubert/Kumho, rather than having the palliative effect of encouraging
latent print examiners to measure their error rate, has had the unintended
consequence of tempting them to make even less sustainable claims.
Thus, in response to a challenge to the admissibility of latent print evidence
under Daubert/Kumho, the government and latent print examiners advanced
the "breathtaking ' 26 claim that the error rate of forensic fingerprint
identification is zero.27
As with infallibility, latent print examiners defend the claim of a zero
error rate even when confronted with known cases of misattribution in real
cases. In a 60 Minutes interview about the Jackson case, Agent Meagher
demonstrated an identification to reporter Leslie Stahl:
MEAGHER: The latent print is, in fact, identical with the known exemplar.
STAHL: It's identical?
MEAGHER: Yes.
STAHL: You can tell that?
MEAGHER: Yes.




MEAGHER: It's a positive identification.
How can a process commit errors and yet be considered infallible?
How can the "error rate" of any technique, let alone one that has been
known to commit errors, be considered zero? In this article, I will argue
25 1 am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this point.
26 United States v. Haward, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2000).
Professor Starrs has suggested that "preposterous" or "unsupportable" would have made
better word choices here. Online posting (Nov. 4, 2000), at http://onin.com/
bums/messages/3/ 21.html?SaturdayMarch2320020950am.
27 Government's Combined Report to the Court and Motions in Limine Concerning
Fingerprint Evidence at 22, United States v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(No. 96-407), available at http://www.clpex.com/Information/USvMitchell/lPreDaubert
HearingMotions/US v MitchellGovtResponse.pdf ("By following the scientific method-
ology of analysis, comparison, evaluation and verification, the error rate remains zero.").
28 60 Minutes: Fingerprints (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 5, 2003). In another
interview, Meagher stated flatly that "its [latent print identification's] error rate is zero."
Steve Berry, Pointing a Finger at Prints, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 2002, at Al.
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that the coexistence of these two contradictory notions is not merely a
product of simple "doublethink."29 Rather, I will show that it the product of
a rhetorical strategy to isolate, minimize, and otherwise dismiss all exposed
cases of error as "special cases," or "one-offs, 30 and therefore as irrelevant.
After a brief legal and technical background discussion in Part I, Part
II of this paper discusses what we do know about the error rate of latent
print identification. Part II.A catalogs twenty-two cases of fingerprint
misattribution that have been reported in the public record. An analysis of
these cases shows that they are most likely only the tip of the proverbial
iceberg of actual cases of fingerprint misattribution. Part II.B discusses the
results of proficiency testing of latent print examiners. These tests also
show a non-zero error rate. In Part III, I discuss what might be called "the
rhetoric of error." This Part analyzes rhetorical efforts by fingerprint
advocates and courts to minimize, dismiss, and explain away the evidence
of error revealed in Part II. Fingerprint practitioners seek to create an error-
free aura around fingerprint identification that has the potential to
dangerously mislead finders of fact. At the end of Part III, I discuss some
more defensible ways of conceptualizing fingerprint error. Far from being
"one-offs," I suggest that the cases of error are more likely the product of
routine practice. Whatever special circumstances exist in the misattribution
cases are more likely to account for the exposure of the misattribution than
the misattribution itself. I conclude by arguing that it is necessary to
confront, analyze, and understand error if we ever hope to reduce it.
I. BACKGROUND
A. LATENT PRINT IDENTIFICATION
Latent print identification is a process of source attribution.3' Latent
print examiners compare "latent" prints taken from crime scenes to prints of
known origin. Although prints taken from suspects using ink or scanners
are typically of good quality-and can be re-taken if they are not-latent
prints are typically partial, smudged, or otherwise distorted. It is the poor
quality of many latent prints that makes latent print identification
problematic. The most valuable aspect of the latent print testimony in
criminal justice proceedings is the attribution of the latent print to the
29 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 214 (1949) ("Doublethink means the power of holding two
contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them.").
30 Pat A. Wertheim, The Connection: Faulty Forensics (NPR radio broadcast, June 10,
2004), available at http://www.theconnection.org/shows/2004/06/20040610b-main.asp.
31 KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDiN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINALISTICS: THE
PROFESSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 123 (2001).
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defendant. Although latent print testimony is often phrased as claiming that
the latent print and the known print of the defendant are "identical," this is
not strictly true; all fingerprint impressions, including those taken from the
same finger, are in some way unique.32 The true import of latent print
testimony is not that the unknown print and the known print are "identical"
but rather that they derive from a common source.33 Since the source of the
known print is known to be the defendant (because someone in the chain of
custody took them from the defendant), the unknown print is then attributed
to the defendant. The defendant is said to be the source of the latent print.
1. Conclusions
In the above respects, latent print identification is similar to many
other areas of forensic analysis. But latent print evidence differs crucially
from most other types of forensic evidence in the manner in which source
attributions are phrased. In forensic DNA analysis, for example, the analyst
typically testifies that the defendant may be the source of a DNA sample.
This statement is then accompanied by a random match probability which
indicates the frequency with which randomly chosen individuals with the
same racial or ethnic background would also be consistent with the
unknown DNA sample. When latent print examiners make a "match,"
however, they always testify that the defendant is the source of the latent
print to the exclusion of all other possible sources in the universe. Latent
print examiners are, in fact, ethically bound to only testify to source
attributions; they are banned from offering probabilistic opinions in court.3'
Latent print examiners are the only forensic expert witnesses who are so
restricted. Latent print examiners are permitted by the (largely
unenforceable) rules of their profession to offer only three possible
conclusions35 from any comparison of a known and unknown set of prints:
32 Id. at 133; CHRISTOPHE CHAMPOD ET AL., FINGERPRINTS AND OTHER RIDGE SKIN
IMPRESSIONS 24 (2004).
33 INMAN& RDIN, supra note 31, at 141.
34 Int'l Ass'n for Identification, Resolution VII, 29 IDENTIFICATION NEws 1 (Aug. 1979)
("[A]ny member, officer or certified latent print examiner who provides oral or written
reports, or gives testimony of possible, probable, or likely friction ridge identification shall
be deemed to be engaged in conduct unbecoming such member, officer, or certified latent
print examiner."); Int'l Ass'n for Identification, Resolution V, 30 IDENTIFICATION NEWS 3
(Aug. 1980) (amending the resolution to allow for such testimony, with qualifications, under
threat of court sanction).
35 Scientific Working Group for Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology
[hereinafter SWGFAST], Friction Ridge Examination Methodology for Latent Print









Many of the press reports about the Mayfield case reported with
apparent surprise the FBI's characterization of an attribution that would
turn out to be erroneous as "a 100 percent positive identification. 3 7 These
reports were apparently unaware of the fact that all latent print attributions
are supposed to be characterized with such an inflated degree of certainty.38
2. Individualization
Latent print examiners reach conclusions of "individualization ' 39 by
finding corresponding "ridge characteristics" '40 between the unknown and
known prints. Any "unexplainable dissimilarity" results in a conclusion of
exclusion. 41  Insufficient correspondences result in a conclusion of"inconclusive."42  "Sufficient" correspondences result in a conclusion of
"individualization," or source attribution.43 A crucial question is, of course,
where the boundary lies between insufficient and sufficient
correspondences. The latent print community has been unable to answer
this question with any precision or consistency other than to posit a circular
answer, which simply rests upon the analyst's subjective measure of
"sufficiency," such as the following: "Sufficiency is the examiner's
36 Id.
37 Sarah Kershaw & Eric Lichtblau, Spain Had Doubts Before U.S. Held Lawyer in
Madrid Blasts, N.Y. TIMEs, May 26, 2004, at Al; David Feige, Printing Problems: The
Inexact Science of Fingerprint Analysis, SLATE (May 27, 2004), available at
http://slate.msn.conid/2101379; see also Application for Material Witness Order and
Warrant Regarding Witness: Brandon Bieri Mayfield at 3, In re Federal Grand Jury
Proceedings 03-01,337 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Or. 2004) (No. 04-MC-9071).
38 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. People v. Ballard, No. 225560, 2003 Mich.
App. LEXIS 547 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003), is a case in point. The court found that the latent
print examiner's "testimony that she was '99 percent' certain that defendant's fingerprint
was found in the stolen car.., had no demonstrated basis in an established scientific
discipline . I. " d. at *9. The irony is that the examiner's undoing probably lay in naming
a figure smaller than 100%.
39 SWGFAST, Methodology, supra note 35, § 3.3.1.
' DAVID R. ASHBAUGH, QUANTITATIVE-QUALITATIVE FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND ADVANCED RIDGEOLOGY 22 (1999).
41 Willam F. Leo, Distortion Versus Dissimilarity in Friction Skin Identification, 48 J.
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 125-26 (1998).
42 SWGFAST, Methodology, supra note 35, at §3.3.3.
41 SWGFAST, Methodology, supra note 35, at § 3.3.1.
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determination that adequate unique details of the friction skin source area
are revealed in the impression."
44
3. Methodology
Recently, latent print examiners have taken to describing their
"methodology" as "ACE-V" (Analyze, Compare, Evaluate - Verify).45 For
our purposes, the important thing to note is the "verification" component in
which a second examiner "ratifies" the conclusions of the initial examiner.
The latent print community has until recently resisted any pressure to
conduct "blind" verification-that is, to prevent the "verifier" from
knowing what conclusion the initial examiner has reached, or even whether
the initial examiner has reached a conclusion.46 An FBI report on the
Mayfield case, however, has now endorsed blind verification in
"designated" cases.47
4. Qualifications
There are no qualifications necessary to render an individual a "latent
print expert"; whether to let an individual testify as such is entirely up to the
court.48 There is, however, a certification program, administered by a
professional organization, the International Association for Identification
(IAI).49 Upon creating the certification program, the IAI specifically stated
that lack of certification should not be construed as rendering a purported
expert unqualified to testify as an expert witness.
50
B. FINGERPRINT ERROR RATES
Although I will criticize below the parsing of error into different
"types," there are some legitimate distinctions to be made when talking
about forensic error. First is the distinction between false positives and
44 SWGFAST, Methodology, supra note 35.
45 ASHBAUGH, supra note 40.
46 CHAMPOD ET AL., supra note 32, at 200 (recommending that verification should be
blind only for especially difficult latent prints).
47 Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the
Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 706, 715 (2004).
48 Pat A. Wertheim, re: Certification (To Be or Not to Be), 42 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 279, 280 (1992) [hereinafter Wertheim, re: Certification].
49 Int'l Ass'n for Identification, Latent Fingerprint Certification, at
http://www.theiai.org/certifications/fingerprint/index.html (last visited May 9, 2005).
50 Wertheim, re. Certification, supra note 48, at 280. ("The IAI has never taken the
position that persons in a particular field should be required to be certified in order to testify.
Nor, to my knowledge, have any courts ever required expert witnesses to be certified by the
IAI.").
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false negatives. These are also sometimes called Type I and Type II errors.
(This distinction, unlike some of those discussed below, is well recognized
in numerous fields of science.) In the context of fingerprint identification, a
false positive would consist of reporting that an individual is the source of
an impression when in fact she is not. A false negative would consist of
reporting that an individual is not the source of an impression when in fact
she is. These errors can be of differing importance depending on the
context. For example, in criminal law the classic formulation of this is
"Blackstone's maxim," which states that it is better to let ten guilty people
go free than to falsely convict one innocent person.51 This would suggest
that false positives are ten times more catastrophic than false negatives.
2
In addition, there are some distinctions that may be made among false
positives based on the stage of the criminal justice process at which the
error is detected. Presumably, some false positives are detected and
corrected within the crime laboratory itself. An analyst may take a second
look at the evidence and change her mind. Alternatively, another analyst
may disagree with the initial analyst's conclusion. In current fingerprint
parlance, this process is known as "verification." The dispute would be
resolved within the laboratory and reported as "inconclusive" or an
exclusion. No one outside the laboratory would know that there had been
an "error." We know very little about these types of errors. They are
unlikely to generate media attention, officially published reports, or legal
records, our primary sources for learning about fingerprint errors. In all
likelihood the disagreement is resolved quietly within the laboratory.
There is legitimate reason to distinguish between errors that are
detected in the laboratory and errors that are not detected until after a
laboratory has in some way input its conclusions into the criminal justice
system, leading to arrest, indictment, trial, or conviction. In the former
case, it may reasonably be argued that whatever safeguards the laboratory
has in place (such as "verification") functioned correctly, detected the error,
and prevented false information from being offered into evidence. It might
reasonably be said, "the system worked." In the latter case, whether the
error is ultimately detected before conviction or after conviction, the error is
nonetheless far more serious. Once the laboratory inputs a conclusion into
the criminal justice, it has effectively terminated whatever processes it has
51 See generally Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173, 174 (1997).
52 In other contexts, one might be more concerned about false negatives than false
positives. For example, one might apply the same technology-fingerprint identification-in
airports to detect known terrorists. In that setting, false negatives (failing to identify a
terrorist who boards an airplane) may be of greater concern than false positives (temporarily
detaining an innocent person on suspicion of being a terrorist).
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in place to detect errors. At this point, responsibility for exposure of the
error rests with other actors, such as the prosecutor, judge, jury, or, mont
important, the defense expert, if there is one.
Thus, it would be oversimplified to speak of "an error rate" of a
forensic fingerprint identification. Are we interested in the rate of false
positives, false negatives, or the sum of the two? How expansive is our
definition of an "error"? Are we interested in errors exposed within the
laboratory, errors exposed after they leave the laboratory, or are we
interested in estimating the prevalence of all actual errors, whether or not
they are exposed? In this article, my focus will be on false positives that
leave the laboratory. I will not discuss false negatives or errors that are
detected within the laboratory. Estimating the number of errors that are
detected within laboratories would be a nearly impossible task for a
laboratory outsider. The latent print community itself could, if it wanted,
produce data about the occurrence of errors within the laboratory. So, for
example, the two false positives committed by Agent Massey back in the
1970s that were detected within the FBI laboratory are not included in my
data set. 3 I omit discussing false negatives because no one disputes that
false negatives occur. The rate and occurrence of false positives, however,
is more controversial.
II. WHAT Do WE KNOW ABOUT ERROR RATES IN LATENT PRINT
IDENTIFICATION?
There are two basic ways of going about calculating an error rate,
neither of which is entirely satisfactory. The ideal method would be to
divide the number of actual cases of error by the number cases in which
fingerprint evidence was used, thus yielding an error rate (or rates-false
positives and false negatives). This approach has a fundamental problem:
we do not know the "ground truth." In casework we do not know whether
the suspect is or is not, in fact, the source of the unknown print. Therefore,
any error rate calculated from casework is inherently untrustworthy. A
second approach would be to run a simulation. In a simulation, the
researcher can control the materials that are submitted to the process or
technique and thus know the ground truth. The drawback to simulations is
that they usually differ in significant ways from the real-world practice to
which their error rates will be extrapolated. Therefore, the extrapolation of
an error rate from simulation to the real world can always potentially be
contested. Indeed, in scientific controversies, the extrapolation from a
53 See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
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simulation to the "real world" will almost inevitably be contested. 4
Therefore, we should expect that any declared error rate for latent print
identification will be contested by one party or the other (or perhaps both).
An accepted error rate will not simply emerge from some academic study.
That is, however, no reason not to try to assess the likelihood of error.
A. FINGERPRINT MISATTRIBUTIONS
1. Case selection
In this section, I use archival analysis of reported cases of
misattribution to attempt to estimate the error rate of latent print
identification. Any effort to calculate the false positive rate of forensic
fingerprint identification from known cases of misattribution is hampered
by the fact that there is no central repository of knowledge about such cases.
No mechanism for recording, compiling, reviewing, or analyzing cases of
fingerprint misattribution exists. Some latent print examiners and legal
scholars have compiled mistattibution cases on various web sites." I have
compiled below those cases known to me through my historical fingerprint
research. Overwhelmingly, these are cases that were reported either in the
media or in published court decisions. Since I have occasionally seen
reference in the fingerprint literature to cases of misattribution that were not
publicized,56 I believe that the number of known cases of misidentification
54 H. M. CoLLINs, CHANGING ORDER: REPLICATION AND INDUCTION IN SCIENTIFIC
PRACTICE (1985).
55 Dusty Clark, Latent Prints: A Forensic Fingerprint Impression Evidence Discussion
Site, at http://www.latent-prints.com (last visited May 8, 2005); Craig Cooley, Law-
Forensic.com, at http://www.law-forensic.com (last visited May 8, 2005); Ed German,
Problem Idents, at http://onin.com/fp/problemidents.html (last visited May 8, 2005);
Michele Triplett, Erroneous Identification, known cases of', in MICHELE TRIPLETT'S
FINGERPRINT DICTIONARY, at http://www.nwlean.net/fprints/e.htm (last visited May 8, 2005).
56 For example, in 1984 Lambourne wrote, "Due to the frank and open policies of our
American counterparts we do know that since early 1981 five members of the International
Association for Identification have had their certification revoked because of erroneous
identifications .... " G. T. C. Lambourne, Fingerprint Standards, 24 MED. Sci. & L. 227,
229 (1984). Three of these probably derived from the Caldwell case, infra Part II.A.3.d.
Depending on when Lambourne actually wrote that statement, one of the examiners referred
to may have been the one implicated in Midwestern, infra Part II.A.3.e The fifth was
probably Margaret Matthers, formerly with the Florida Department of Criminal Law
Enforcement of Sanford, Florida, whose certification was revoked in August 1980 "for
having furnished testimony to an erroneous identification." Certification Revoked, 31
IDENTIFICATION NEWS 2 (Feb. 1981) [hereinafter Certification Revoked, Feb.]. No further
information on this erroneous identification was available, and it is unlikely to be among the
cases reported here.
Similarly, in 1995 Professor Moenssens referred to "a great number of criminal cases
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listed here is probably significantly less than the number known to the
"collective mind" of the fingerprint profession.
A second problem concerns case selection. Case selection for any
such exercise raises difficult methodological problems. Criteria for case
selection that are too liberal may overstate the potential for latent print
error, whereas criteria that are too conservative may understate it.
Moreover, how do we determine that a latent print attribution was
erroneous? Even in cases that are widely treated within the fingerprint
community itself as clear errors, there is rarely definitive scientific proof
that the attribution was erroneous. 7 Only in two of the cases listed below,
Hatfield, infra Part II.A.3.o, and Cowans, infra Part II.A.3.q, is there
definitive proof that that attribution was erroneous. In Hatfield, a forensic
technician used fingerprint impressions to identify a corpse.58 The
individual identified as the corpse turned out to be alive.59 Cowans was
excluded as the source of DNA evidence which was taken from the same
object as the latent print.6° In most of the other cases, the "evidence" that
the match was erroneous consists of the consensus of the fingerprint
community itself. This creates difficulty because it demands using the very
technique that is being questioned to establish the ground truth.61
[in which] an expert or consultant on fingerprint for the defense has been instrumental in
seriously undermining the state's case by demonstrating faulty procedures used by the state's
witnesses or by simply showing human errors in the use of fingerprint evidence." ANDRt
MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 516 (4th ed. 1995).
It seems unlikely that all of Moenssens's "great number" of cases are represented in my
study. In addition, Dr. David Stoney reports having discovered three erroneous attributions
in "around 500" fingerprint cases that he has reviewed. David A. Stoney, Challenges to
Fingerprint Comparisons, Address at Fingerprints: Forensic Applications, DePaul
University Center for Law and Science (April 15, 2002). It is unlikely that all of Stoney's
cases are represented in my study.
57 Professor Gary Edmond points out that our treatment of supposed miscarriages of
justice is "asymmetric." That is, once we have decided that the defendant was innocent, we
interpret all the evidence in that light, just as the evidence was originally interpreted in light
of the theory that the defendant was guilty. Gary Edmond, Constructing Miscarriages of
Justice: Misunderstanding Scientific Evidence in High Profile Criminal Appeals, 22 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (2002).
58 Michael Coit, Santa Rosa Woman Identified as Vegas Slaying Victim Turns Up Alive,
SANTA ROSA PREss DEMOCRAT, Sept. 13, 2002, at Al.
59 Id.
60 Saltzman & Daniel, supra note 5.
61 In addition, there is some ambiguity between cases in which the consensus of latent
print examiners is that the proper conclusion was "exclusion"-that is, that a print was
attributed to someone who was not, in fact, its source-and cases in which the consensus of
latent print examiners is that the proper conclusion was "inconclusive"-that is, a print was
attributed to someone who may well have made it, but not enough information was available
to make that determination. Obviously, the situation in these two scenarios is quite different,
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In most cases, there is no way of proving that the attribution was
erroneous without assuming the very infallibility of latent print examiners'
consensus judgments that these cases undermine. For example, McKie, one
of the best-known cases of "error," (infra Part III.A.3.1), is generally viewed
within the latent print community as an erroneous attribution.62 But, in fact,
we have no way of knowing that Shirley McKie did not make the print in
question, other than through the consensus judgment of latent print
examiners. In McKie (unusually), there is not even a complete consensus.
Some latent print examiners continue to stake their professional reputations
on the claim that McKie was indeed the source of the disputed print.
63
In Table 1 and Part II.A.3, I list and discuss twenty-two cases of latent
print "misattributions." These are cases where the consensus of opinion in
the latent print community itself holds that attribution is erroneous. The
conservative nature of my case selection has led me to exclude from my
sample several cases of "disputed attributions., 64 These are cases in which
reputable latent print examiners have either declined to corroborate an
attribution (claimed the correct conclusion should have been
"inconclusive") or disagreed about the attribution of a latent print (claimed
the correct conclusion should have been "exclusion"), but there is no
65consensus judgment that the attribution was erroneous.
both scientifically and legally, but in many cases it is impossible to determine from the
sources available which type of error has occurred.
62 David L. Grieve, Built By Many Hands, 49 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 565, 574-75
(1999); David L. Grieve, Forest and Trees, 50 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 538 (2000);
David L. Grieve, Getting Things Right, 50 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 229, 238 (2000);
David L. Grieve, No Free Lunch, 50 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 426,432 (2000).
63 Kasey Wertheim, 2002-2003 Report from the Science and Practice Committee, 53 J.
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 603, 604 (2003); Malcolm Graham, Your Comments on
Fingerprints on Trial, BBC NEWS, May 19, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
programmes/panorama!1997258.stm, Letter from David A. Russell, Solicitor, Towells
Solicitors, to the Lord Advocate, Crown Office (Apr. 28, 2005) (available at
http://shirleymckie.com/documents/LetterRussellversion.pdf).
64 These cases include: United States v. Alteme, No. 99-8131-CR-FERGUSON (S.D.
Fla. 2000) (Hilerdieu Alteme); Commonwealth v. Siehl, 657 A.2d 490 (Pa. 1995) (Kevin
Siehl) (Mr. Siehl is currently serving a sentence of life without parole for murder, based in
part on fingerprint attribution which two experts have now declared was erroneous);
Associated Press, Defendant Is Linked to 2 Prints, MIAMI HERALD, May 1, 1985, at 2D
(Michael Lanier); Associated Press, Teen Cleared in Flute Death, MIAMI HERALD, May 5,
1985, at 6D (Michael Lanier); Email communication with Ralph Haber, June 22, 2004 (on
file with author) (Jos6 Arelleno); Ralph Haber & Lyn Haber, Two Latent Prints Matched to
Defendant with Absolute Certainty, to the Exclusion of all Others; and an Acquittal in
Federal Court (Oct. 8, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (Thomas
Cooley).
65 These cases may be construed as errors of a sort even if the defendant was in fact the
source of the disputed print. This is because of a peculiar attribute that distinguishes latent
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2. Intentional Misattribution (Fraud)
Finally, I have also excluded here any discussion of cases of alleged
fraud, forgery, or fabrications. Again, distinguishing between fraudulent
intent and honest error poses problems. Typically, an examiner involved in
a misattribution is well advised not to talk to the authorities. Even if the
examiner were willing to talk, any effort to divine the examiner's state of
mind during the error is inherently difficult and unreliable. Some of the
cases discussed here (e.g., MeKie/Asbury, Cowans) have been alleged to
have been caused by fraud.66 Ultimately, to assign one of these cases to
print evidence for virtually every other type of expert evidence: Latent print examiners are
not supposed to disagree about attributions. Simon A. Cole, Witnessing Identification:
Latent Fingerprint Evidence and Expert Knowledge, 28 Soc. STUD. OF Sci. 687, 700 (1998)
[hereinafter Cole, Witnessing Identification]. They are only supposed to go forward with
attributions that all other qualified peers would corroborate. David R. Ashbaugh, The
Premise of Friction Ridge Identification, Clarity, and the Identification Process, 44 J.
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 499 (1994) ("Others with equal knowledge and ability must be
able to see what you see."); Robert D. Olsen, Sr. & Henry C. Lee, Identification of Latent
Prints, in ADvANCEs IN FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 41 (Lee and Gaensslen eds., 2001)
("Above all, the experienced examiner knows that the validity of the identification can be
demonstrated to the satisfaction of other qualified examiners."). If there is any doubt about
whether peers would corroborate an attribution, latent print examiners are supposed to
classify the comparison as "inconclusive." This is admittedly a curious practice, one that, if
strictly adhered to, would result in the ruthless discarding of potentially probative evidence,
but it is, of course, a necessary practice for latent print examiners to sustain their myth of
infallibility. Cole, Witnessing Identification, supra, at 702; Simon Cole, What Counts for
Identity? The Historical Origins of the Methodology of Latent Fingerprint Identification, 12
SCIENCE IN CONTEXT 139 (1999) [hereinafter Cole, What Counts for Identity?]. In any case,
it is a principle to which latent print examiners claim to adhere. This suggests that the latter
category of cases are "errors" in that the examiners ought not to have gone forward with
them because other qualified examiners declined to corroborate them. Although the prints in
question may, in fact, belong to the individual to whom they were attributed, the evidence
was not strong enough to constitute an "identification." To draw an analogy with studies of
miscarriages of justice, my "misattributions" might be likened to cases of "actual
innocence," and my "disputed identifications" might be likened to reversals, in which the
defendant may or may not be, in fact, guilty of the crime, but, in either case, ought not to
have been convicted.
For this reason, even the "disputed identifications" may properly be considered
"errors" of some kind in that it was presumably poor judgment, or perhaps even poor ethics,
for the examiner to go forward with the identification if it was so marginal that it would
invite dispute. This is true even if the ground truth is that the print does, in fact, belong to
the individual to whom it was attributed. Were such cases included, the misattributions data
set that I present below would, of course, be significantly larger. Nonetheless, when I
discuss errors in this paper, I will limit myself to the cases I have listed as "misattributions."
66 Pat A. Wertheim, Problem Identifications, Latent Print Examination (June 4, 2000), at
http://onin.com/bums/messages/3/16.html?ThursdayAugust320000441pm (describing the
McKie case: "the 'identification' is so obviously erroneous that I must believe the four
experts knew of the mistake long before the case came to trial"). Wertheim's argument is
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fraud would require knowing the state of mind of the latent print examiner
at the time of the misattribution, which, in most cases, will be an impossible
task.
Certainly, there are numerous cases in which fraudulent intent has
been fairly clearly documented.67 I do not discuss those cases here. My
interest here is primarily in unintentional misattributions, which constitute a
more difficult problem than fraud. That fraud occurs in the fingerprint field
is to be expected and not generally disputed. That unintentional
misattributions can occur is a far more controversial matter. In addition,
unintentional misattributions are probably more difficult to detect. The
cases of fingerprint fraud, and forensic fraud in general, demonstrate that
vigilante forensic scientists often leave ample paper trails that make their
misdeeds easily traceable and documentable, once the analyst has been
exposed as fraudulent. 68 Far more difficult to detect are cases in which the
analyst honestly believes in an erroneous conclusion.
3. Known cases offingerprint misattribution
a. Loomis
Robert Loomis was convicted in 1920 for the murder of Bertha Myers
during a burglary in 1918 in Easton, Pennsylvania. 69  Two latent print
experts testified for the government that a latent print found on a jewelry
box could be identified to Loomis. 70 Loomis won a new trial on the basis of
faulty jury instructions.71  At Loomis's second trial, the government
admitted that Loomis was not the source of the latent print and declined to
questionable, though, given that other experts, external to the case, have agreed with the four
experts' conclusion. See supra sources cited note 63 and accompanying text.
67 NELSON E. ROTH, THE NEW YORK STATE POLICE EVIDENCE TAMPERING
INVESTIGATION, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE GEORGE PATAKI, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK (1997); Boris Geller et al., A Chronological Review of Fingerprint Forgery, 44 J.
FORENSIC Sci. 963 (1999); Boris Geller et al., Fingerprint Forgery-A Survey, 46 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 731 (2001); Pat A. Wertheim, Detection of Forged and Fabricated Latent
Prints: Historical Review and Ethical Implications of the Falsification of Latent Fingerprint
Evidence, 44 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 652 (1994).
68 See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND
How TO MAKE IT RIGHT 160-62 (2003).
69 Commonwealth v. Loomis, 113 A. 428 (Pa. 1921); Commonwealth v. Loomis, 110 A.
257 (Pa. 1920). For a more complete discussion, see SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A
HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 192 (2001) [hereinafter COLE,
SUSPECT IDENTITIES].




offer it into evidence.72 The record does not show what led the government
to this conclusion. Loomis then sought to enter the print into evidence,
claiming it belonged to the true perpetrator.73
b. Stevens
A latent print found on a calling card at the scene of the notorious
Hall-Mills murders in New Brunswick, New Jersey in 1926 was attributed
to William Stevens by three latent print examiners. 74 Interestingly, one of
the examiners was Joseph Faurot, who had been one of the first examiners
to offer testimony in court in the United States.75 Two latent print
examiners testified for the defense and claimed the attribution was
erroneous, but they also contended, inconsistently, that the print might have
been forged. Stevens was acquitted; the jury reportedly disregarded the
latent print evidence.76
c. Stoppelli
John "The Bug" Stoppelli was convicted in 1948 for the sale of
narcotics in Oakland.77 After a drug raid, in which four other suspects were
arrested, a latent print was recovered from an envelope containing heroin.78
The print did not match any of the four arrested. 79 After an extensive
database search, Internal Revenue Agent W. Harold "Bucky" Greene
attributed the latent to Stoppelli, a parolee in New York City. 80 Greene
found fourteen matching ridge characteristics. 81 No other evidence linked
Stoppelli to the crime.
82
Stoppelli was convicted.83 Eventually, his attorney, Jake Ehrlich,
convinced the arresting officer, Colonel White, to talk to Stoppelli.84 White
became convinced of Stoppelli's innocence and had the print reviewed by
72 Loomis, 113 A. at 431.
73 id.
74 GERALD TOMLiNSON, FATAL TRYST (1999); Triplett, supra note 55.
75 COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra note 69, at 181-85.
76 Triplett, supra note 55.
77 JOHN WESLEY NOBLE & BERNARD AVERBUCH, NEVER PLEAD GUILTY: TIE STORY OF
JAKE EHRLICH 295 (1955); R. M. Vollmer, Report of Science and Practice Committee, 6
IDENTIFICATION NEWS 1 (1956).
78 NOBLE & AVERBUCH, supra note 77, at 295.
79 Id. at 296.
80 Id.
81 Id; Vollmer, supra note 77, at 1.
82 NOBLE & AVERBUCH, supra note 77, at 296.
83 id.
14 Id. at 297.
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the FBI laboratory.85 The FBI excluded Stoppelli as the source of the print,
and President Truman commuted his sentence.86 He had served two years.87
d. Caldwell
Roger Caldwell was convicted of the murder of Elisabeth Congdon in
Minnesota in 1978.88 Three latent print examiners attributed a latent print
found on an envelope to Roger Caldwell. The envelope was addressed to
Caldwell and contained a gold coin believed to have been stolen from the
victim's home.89 The examiners were: Steven Sedlacek, who testified for
the government at trial, Claude Cook, who "verified" Sedlacek's
identification, and Ronald Welbaum, who was retained by Caldwell and
also corroborated the match.90 All three were IAI-Certified Latent Print
Examiners. 91 Sedlacek testified that "the latent print partial... I found to
be identical with the inked impression on the fingerprint card bearing the
name Roger Caldwell. '92 This conclusion was based on eleven matching
ridge characteristics and no unexplainable dissimilarities.93
The original negative of the latent print was reexamined for the trial of
Caldwell's wife and supposed co-conspirator, Marjorie Caldwell. The
forensic scientist Herbert MacDonell and the latent print examiners George
Bonebrake and Walter Rhodes testified that Roger Caldwell could not have
been the source of the latent print. Marjorie Caldwell was acquitted, and
Roger won a new trial. That the fingerprint evidence was erroneous does
not necessarily exonerate the Caldwells, and Roger Caldwell eventually
pled guilty to time served rather than submitting to a new trial. On the
other hand, a guilty plea to time served is a difficult offer for even an
innocent person to refuse and is, therefore, not particularly convincing
85 Id.
86 Id at 298.
87 Id.
88 State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982); James E. Starrs, A Miscue in
Fingerprint Identification: Causes and Concern, 12 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMrN. 287 (1984);
Certification Revoked, Feb., supra note 56; Certification Revoked, 31 IDENTIFICATION NEWS
2 (Sept. 1981) [hereinafter Certification Revoked, Sept.].
89 Stars, supra note 88, at 288.
90 Id. at 288, 292; Certification Revoked, Feb., supra note 56; Certification Revoked,
Sept., supra note 88.
91 Starts, supra note 88, at 292; Certification Revoked, Feb., supra note 56; Certification
Revoked, Sept., supra note 88.




evidence of Caldwell's guilt.94 Sedlacek, Cook, and Welbaum had their
certifications revoked by the IAI.
e. "Midwestern"
Special Agent German reports a case of erroneous identification
reported by an examiner from "a small American police department in the
Midwest" in 1984.95 The nature of the crime is not reported. The defendant
was a parolee. 96 Testimony implicating the defendant based on latent print
evidence was given at a preliminary hearing and parole revocation hearing.
The latent print examiner was IAI-certified 97 and was decertified upon
exposure of the error. The defendant was released upon exposure of the
misidentification.98 German reports that "[t]he Latent Print Examiner,
being relatively new in the business, had not previously caused anyone's
incarceration based upon fingerprint evidence and the Prosecutor decided
that no future warrants would be issued based on just the local examiner's
work." 99 After decertification, the examiner continued to work as a police
officer, crime scene technician, and, apparently, latent print examiner, since
German reports that the examiner "to my knowledge has since always
submitted fingerprint identifications to outside agencies for verification.'
100
German withholds the identifying details "because I am proud of his (and
his department's) integrity and professionalism."'
0'1
f. Cooper
Michael Cooper was arrested for being the "Prime Time Rapist," a
serial rapist, in Tucson, Arizona in 1988.102 Two latent prints from two
14 Id. at 295.
95 Ed German, Latent Print Examination: Fingerprints, PaImprints and Footprints, at
http://onin.com/fp/problemidents.html (last visited May 9, 2005).
96 id.
97 According to German, id., the examiner had passed the IAI certification examination.
He was not one of those who was "grandfathered" into the certification program.
98 id.
99 Id. German's language is ambiguous. If he literally means that the examiner "had not
previously caused anyone's incarceration based upon fingerprint evidence," this would be
rather surprising for a certified examiner. If, however, he means that the examiner "had not




102 Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992); James E. Stars, More
Saltimbancos on the Loose? Fingerprint Experts Caught in a World of Error, 12 Sci.
SLEUTHrNG NEWSL. 1, 1(1988).
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different crime scenes were attributed to Cooper by two law enforcement
personnel: Timothy O'Sullivan and Gene P. Scott.10 3 While O'Sullivan
apparently had minimal latent print experience, Scott was a Supervisor.
10 4
The examiners claimed to have found "eleven or twelve" corresponding
ridge characteristics between a crime scene print and an inked print taken
from Cooper,10 5 and Scott called the match a positive comparison. 0 6 On
the basis of the fingerprint evidence, Cooper was subjected to an illegal
interrogation, which the Ninth Circuit later decided violated his civil
rights. 0 7  During the interrogation, one investigator, Weaver Barkman,
began to harbor doubts about Cooper's guilt, which he expressed outside
the interrogation room.10 8  According to Barkman, his supervisor, Tom
Taylor, "said something very close to fingerprints do not lie. Get your ass
back in there, Weaver."' 09  Identification technician Mary McCall also
participated in the interrogation, telling Cooper that he had been positively
identified by fingerprint evidence. 10 The record does not show whether or
not McCall had yet examined the evidence herself. Upon double-checking
her work, however, McCall began to doubt the match."' O'Sullivan and
Scott initially "ignored her and declined to reexamine the exemplars."" 2
Eventually, however, the examiners changed their conclusion to one of
exclusion. At the time, they maintained that there were twelve
corresponding ridge characteristics but also some unexplainable
dissimilarities, which rendered the comparison an exclusion." 3 Scott and
O'Sullivan were demoted, and McCall was suspended for two days without
pay.
114
103 Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1228; Starrs, supra note 102, at 6.
104 Starrs, supra note 102, at 6.
105 Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1233.
106 Id. at 1228.
107 Id. at 1220.
108 Id. at 1232.
109 Id.
0 Id. Although the Supreme Court has ruled that it is permissible for police
interrogators to use such tactics as falsely telling a suspect that they have incriminating
fingerprint evidence, the significant thing in this case was that McCall's statements were
sincerely believed, not deliberate lies. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
111 Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1232.
112 id.
11' Id.




Bruce Basden was arrested in 1985 for the murders of Remus and
Blanche Adams in Fayetteville, North Carolina.115 A latent print found in
the Adams' home was attributed to Basden by latent print examiner John
Trogden.1 6 Upon reexamining and enlarging the evidence in response to a
discovery request by the defense, Trogden withdrew his conclusion of
identification. 1 7 The charges were dismissed. Basden had been jailed for
thirteen months. 1
8
The FBI and the North Carolina State Bureau of Identification
reviewed the work of Trogden and another latent print examiner named Sue
George. 19 Their review found three erroneous identifications. 20 A latent
print in a burglary case was attributed to Maurice Gaining, who had been
convicted of burglary and sentenced to ten years. 12 1 The print apparently
belonged to Gaining's co-defendant James Hammock. 122 Other latent print
evidence, reportedly correctly attributed, remained against Gaining in other
pending burglary cases. 123 Coincidentally, one of the other misattributed
prints was attributed to Hammock in another burglary case for which he
was sentenced to ten years. 24 Again, there was additional print evidence,
apparently correctly attributed, against Hammock.125 The third error was
the attribution of a palm print to Darian Carter.126 Carter had been convicted
of larceny and sentenced to ten years. 127 Again, there were also two
fingerprints, which had apparently been correctly attributed to Carter.
128
Identification Bureau officials noted that the errors occurred "early in the
identification careers" of Trogden and George, that the examiners "did not
have [the] luxury" of "leam[ing] from more experienced people," and that
... Id. at 1.





121 Id.; Barry Bowden, Judge Throws Out Theft Sentence, FAYETEVILLE OBSERVER
(N.C.), Feb. 5, 1988.




126 Barry Bowden, Law Officials Find Error in Hand Print Matching, FAYETTEVELLE
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they "had identified a record 118 fingerprints in 1987.7129 Trogden and
George remained on the job. Their supervisor commented, "I'm not going
to throw them out because of a mistake. I think with additional experience
and training, our print examiners will be the finest in the state." 3'
h. Lee
Neville Lee was arrested in 1991 in Nottinghamshire, England, for the
rape of an eleven-year-old girl on the basis of a supposed fingerprint
match.13' It is not known how many corresponding ridge characteristics
were identified, but at that time a minimum requirement of sixteen
matching ridge characteristics was in force in the United Kingdom.
132
Lee's home was wrecked by vigilantes, and he was assaulted in jail.
133
Another individual subsequently confessed to the crime, and Lee was




Martin Blake 136 was arrested and interrogated for three days in 1994
for the murder of seven people during a robbery in Palatine, Illinois. 137 A
Chicago Police Department latent print examiner matched a print from the
crime scene, a Brown's Chicken & Pasta, to Blake. 138 Upon review by the
Illinois State Police and the FBI, the match was determined to be
erroneous. 139
129 Barry Bowden & Mike Barrett, Fingerprint Errors Raise Questions on Local
Convictions, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (N.C.), Jan, 15, 1988.
130 id.






136 The newspaper account of this case does not give the victim of erroneous
identification's name. He is identified as Martin Blake by Craig Cooley in Forgettable
Science or Forensic Science: Wrongful Convictions and Accusations Attributable to
Forensic Science, at http://www.law-forensic.com/cfr-sciencemyth.htm (last visited May 8,
2005).






Andrew Chiory was charged in 1996 for the burglary of the home of
Miriam Stoppard, a writer and broadcaster who also happened to be the ex-
wife of the well-known playwright Tom Stoppard, in London, England.
140
Two separate latent prints from the crime scene were attributed to
Chiory. 141 Both matches were "allegedly triple-checked," and both were
conducted under the requirement for sixteen corresponding ridge
characteristics in force in the United Kingdom at that time. 142 Chiory
served two months in prison before the match was exposed as erroneous.
143
Despite an extensive external investigation of this miscarriage of justice, 144
no explanation for the misidentification has ever been made public.
k. McNamee
Danny McNamee was convicted in England in 1987 of conspiracy to
cause explosions. 45 He was dubbed the "Hyde Park Bomber" for his
alleged role in a 1982 Irish Republican Army bombing that killed four
soldiers and seven horses. 146 McNamee was implicated in the crime by
three latent prints: two from tape found with explosive-making equipment,
and one from a battery recovered from debris after a controlled explosion in
London. 147 The latent print from the battery was the most incriminating. At
McNamee's trial, Metropolitan Police latent print examiners offered
evidence that McNamee was the source of the latent print on the battery.1
48
As McNamee appealed his conviction, controversy emerged over the
battery print. At least fourteen different examiners analyzed the
evidence. 149  Two Glasgow examiners found eleven corresponding
characteristics between the latent print and McNamee's inked prints, but
they were not the same eleven characteristics. 50 At least two Dorset
examiners also attributed the print to McNamee, but did not agree with
some of the corresponding ridge characteristics identified by the original
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examiners.151 Other experts, including Peter Swann and Martin Leadbetter,
found the latent print insufficient for identification.'52 The appeals court
quashed the fingerprint evidence, the case collapsed, and McNamee was
released in 1998 after serving eleven years in prison.
153
1. Scottish Criminal Records Office Cases
These were the best-known cases of fingerprint misidentification until
the Mayfield case. The cases surrounded the murder of Marion Ross in
Kilmarnock, Scotland in 1997.4 David Asbury was identified as a suspect,
in part, based on a latent print found on biscuit tin in his home containing a
substantial amount of cash. The print was attributed to Marion Ross.
155
Asbury was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison.
156
Shirley McKie, a detective with the Strathclyde Police Department,
had been assigned to secure the crime scene. 157 A latent print found inside
Ross's house was attributed to McKie. 58  (It is standard practice to
"eliminate" latent prints by checking them against the known prints of non-
suspects, such as victims and investigating police officers.) McKie denied
entering the house.1 59 After resisting substantial pressure to admit having
abandoned her post and entered the house, McKie was charged with
perjury. 16  Both the Ross and McKie fingerprint matches were attested to
by four (the same four in both cases) 161 latent print examiners from the
Scottish Criminal Records Office (SCRO) and were described as meeting
the British requirement of having at least sixteen corresponding ridge
characteristics. 162 However, unbeknownst to either prosecution or defense,
five SCRO examiners had declined to attribute the disputed print to




154 Shelley Jofre, Falsely Fingered, GuARDIAN, July 9, 2001; Michael Specter, Do
Fingerprints Lie?, NEW YORKER, May 27, 2002, at 96.
155 Jofre, supra note 154.






161 Pat Wertheim, David Asbury Case, at http://onin.com/fp/problemidents.html (last
visited May 8, 2005).
162 Jofre, supra note 154.
163 McKie v. Strathclyde Joint Police Board, Sess. Cas. (Dec. 24, 2003) (Scotland),
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opinion that she was telling the truth was "told that any question of a
mistake in the fingerprint evidence was 'unthinkable because of its
implications."1
64
On the eve of McKie's trial, in 1999, she and her father lain McKie, a
former police officer, persuaded two American examiners, Pat Wertheim
and David Grieve, to come to the Scotland to reexamine the evidence.
165
Wertheim and Grieve testified that McKie could not be the source of the
latent print. 166 McKie was acquitted and released. 
67
In 2002, the biscuit tin latent was reviewed by Wertheim and Allan
Bayle, a former Scotland Yard examiner. 168  They concluded that Ross
could not be the source of the print. 169 In other words, the SCRO had
allegedly made two erroneous identifications in a single investigation.
Asbury was released. 70  This does not necessarily mean that he was
actually innocent.
McKie sued the police, 171 and a full investigation into the SCRO was
launched. 72 Two extensive reports issued in response to the scandal said a
great deal about the organizational culture and procedures of the Scottish
Criminal Records Office, but virtually nothing about the technical details of
the McKie and Asbury attributions themselves and why they may have
occurred. 173 Reforms were instituted at the SCRO.
17 4
Another SCRO case emerged after the reforms undertaken in response
to the McKie case. Mark Sinclair was convicted of armed robbery in 2003,
in part based on a latent print from one of the crime scenes. SCRO
examiners testified that they had "no doubt" that Sinclair was the source of
available at http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/A4960.html [hereinafter MeKie].
164 Inquiry Call Into Prints Case, BBC NEWS, June 23, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/3012294.stm (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).






171 McKie, supra note 163.
172 Inquiry into Fingerprint Evidence, BBC NEWS, Feb, 7, 2000, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/scotland/newsid_634000/634282.stm.
173 ASS'N OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS IN SCOTLAND, PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW OF S.C.R.O.
INTERIM REPORT (2000), available at http://www.scottish.police.uk/main/
campaigns/interim/join.pdf; ASS'N OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS IN SCOTLAND, REPORT OF THE
SCRUTINY OF THE SCRO FINGERPRINT BUREAU AND STRUCTURE OF THE SCOTTISH
FINGERPRINT SERVICE (2000), available at http://www.scottish.police.uk/main/
campaigns/interim/report.pdf.
174 Inquiry Call Into Prints Case, supra note 164.
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the latent print.175  Allan Bayle concluded the "identification to be
unsafe.' '176 Two examiners from the Police Service of Northern Ireland
agreed that the latent print was insufficient for identification. 77 Because no
consensus has formed, the Sinclair case is not included as a misattribution
in my data set.
m. Jackson
In 1998, Richard Jackson was convicted and sentenced to life in prison
for the murder of Alvin Davis, his friend and occasional lover, in Upper
Darby, Pennsylvania. The sole evidence against Jackson was a latent print
found on a fan in Davis's home. Three latent print examiners attributed the
crime scene print to Jackson: Anthony Paparo of the Upper Darby police,
William Welsh of the county police, and Jon Creighton, an IAI-certified
examiner from Vermont. 178  Jackson hired his own experts, Vernon
McCloud and George Wynn, both former examiners for federal agencies,
who concluded that he was not the source of the print. 179 With McCloud
and Wynn questioning the prints, the government hired a consultant,
Eugene Famiglietti. According to District Attorney Patrick Meehan,
Famiglietti said, "You guys made a gutsy call. Stick to your guns.'
180
Later, however, Famiglietti said the comparison was inconclusive.' 8'
Although McCloud and Wynn testified at trial, the jury convicted
Jackson, and he was sentenced to life in prison. After Jackson was
convicted, McCloud and Wynn complained to the IAI and the FBI. 82 The
FBI and the five members of the IAI Latent Print Certification Board
reviewed the evidence and agreed with McCloud and Wynn's conclusion
that Jackson was not the source of the print. 8 3 After some prosecutorial
resistance and delays, Jackson was released, having served two years in
prison.184 The true perpetrator has never been caught. 85 Creighton was
decertified by the IAI.1
8 6




178 Rachel Scheier, New Trial Sought in U. Darby Slaying, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 16,
1999, available at www.prisonactivist.org/news/1999/08/0089.html.
179 Id.
1s0 Mary Anne Janco, Release of Convicted Killer Is Sought, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 24,
1999, at B 1.
181 Id
182 Scheier, supra note 178.
183 Id.




Journalists' investigation of two disputed identifications in
Manchester, England (the Wallace case and McNamara case) 187 turned up
an erroneous identification that occurred in 2000.188 This attribution had
been "triple-checked." The suspect had a convincing alibi and did not fit
the witness's description. It was eventually discarded as an erroneous
identification. 189  It is not known how many corresponding ridge
characteristics were testified to in these two misidentifications, but the
sixteen-point minimum standard was in place in the United Kingdom at that
time.
Found That Fingerprints at a Murder Scene Were Not Those of Richard Jackson, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Dec. 24, 1999, at B1.
185 Mary Anne Janco, Case Withdrawn Against Pa. Man Convicted, Jailed in 1997
Murder, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 8, 2000, at B 1.
186 Scheier, supra note 178.
187 Neither the Wallace case nor the McNamara case meets my conservative criteria for
inclusion among the misattributions data set, although they are both dubious identifications.
Stephen Wallace was tried for burglary in Manchester in 2000. The sole evidence against
him was a latent print found at the crime scene. Three latent print examiners attributed the
latent print to Wallace. An independent review by retired latent print examiner Mike Armer
found that Wallace was not the source of the latent print. Wallace was acquitted. A
spokesman for the Greater Manchester Police said, "Fingrprint Evidence is a matter of
opinion and is subject to clarification at any time." Joanne Hanpson, Fingerprint Blunder
Has Left My Life in Ruins, MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS (Eng.), July 12, 2001 at 7. The
Wallace case only became publicly known after it was publicized by journalists investigating
the McNamara case. See Panorama: Pointing the Finger at Greater Manchester Police,
BBC NEWS, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/programmes/panorama/1993373.stm
(last visited May 8, 2005) (Wallace case).
The McNamara case is unusual in that the donor of the latent print is not disputed, but,
rather, the surface from which it originated (the "substrate") is disputed. Alan McNamara
was convicted of burglary in Manchester, England, based on a latent print found on a
wooden jewelry box. McNamara's experts, Pat Wertheim and Allan Bayle, agree with the
attribution of the print to McNamara, but contended that it was impossible that the substrate
from which the latent print was recovered was the wooden jewelry box because the latent
print lacked wood grain. The police contended that the wood grain was not reproduced
because of the lifting technique. Wertheim and Bayle contended the latent print "came from
a smooth, curved surface, such as a vase which was sold at Mr. McNamara's shop."
McNamara was convicted of burglary and sentenced to two and half years in prison. He is
currently in prison appealing his conviction. See Shelley Jofre, Panorama: Finger of
Suspicion, BBC NEWS, July 8, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
programmes/panorama/l416777.stm; R. v. McNamara, 2004 EWCA Crim 2818.
188 Panorama: Pointing the Finger at Greater Manchester Police, supra note 187.
189 Jofre, supra note 187.
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o. Hatfield
Kathleen Hatfield was mistakenly identified as dead, based on an
erroneous fingerprint identification in 2002.190 In June 2002, an
unidentified corpse was found in the desert near Las Vegas, Nevada. "After
some skin restoration using tissue builder," the coroner was able to obtain a
single thumbprint "of value."' 191 This print was compared unsuccessfully
with a number of inked prints from missing persons. Hatfield, a forty-six-
year-old transient from Sonoma County, California, had been listed as a
missing person in May by her mother.' 92 Hatfield matched the physical
description of the corpse. The California Sheriffs Office faxed a copy of
Hatfield's ten-print card to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department. 193 The prints were examined by a Law Enforcement Support
Technician Supervisor. This individual did not work in the ten-print section
of the Police Department but had twenty-five years of ten-print experience
and "had been helping the coroner's office make identifications for many
years."'194 This individual identified the body as Hatfield based on the
fingerprints. Las Vegas Police Detective David Mesinar said, "We only
had one readable fingerprint, and it was so close a match that they went
ahead and made an identification."'1 95 Hatfield's mother was informed, and
funeral preparations were made. Hatfield had by this time been stopped and
released by the Sonoma County police. The Sonoma County sheriffs began
looking for Hatfield and eventually found her in August. Her mother was
informed. Hatfield's grave had already been dug.
196
Meanwhile, the Sonoma County Sheriff's Office mailed Hatfield's ten-
print card to Las Vegas. The Technician re-examined the print and decided
that she had made an error. 97 The Las Vegas Municipal Police Department
Latent Print Unit confirmed that the prints did not match. No official
analysis of the erroneous identification has been made public.
190 Coit, supra note 58.
191 Dusty Clark, A Body of a Woman Was Found Out in the Desert near Las Vegas
(2003), available at http://www.latent-prints.com/a bodyof awoman was found out .
htm.
192 Coit, supra note 58.
193 Clark, supra note 191.
194 Id.
195 Coit, supra note 58.
196 Id.




In 2001, David Valken-Leduc was charged with the 1996 murder of a
motel clerk in Woods Cross, Utah. 198 Latent print examiner Scott Spjut
testified at a preliminary hearing that Valken-Leduc was the source of two
bloody prints found at the crime scene. 199 Spjut was not merely an IAI-
certified examiner; he was 'the Chair of the 1AI Latent Print Certification
Board, the body that oversees the certification examination (and had helped
determined that the match in the Jackson case was erroneous, see infra Part
II.A.3 .m). 200 Spjut subsequently died, shot by a rifle he was examining in
the laboratory.2 °1 Whether the shooting was accidental or suicide is still not
clear. After Spjut died, the crime laboratory reviewed his findings and
found that the victim was the actual source of the bloody crime-scene
prints.20 2 Whether the misattribution was fraud or an "honest error" is also
not clear. Crime Laboratory Director Rich Townsend told the press,
"We're mystified as to how he came up with this conclusion with his level
of training and expertise., 20 3 But Valken-Leduc's attorney told the press,
"[O]ur first line of attack was going to be that [Spjut] had manufactured
evidence in other cases." 20 4  No such additional cases have yet been
reported.
q. Cowans
The Cowans case is the first in which DNA evidence played a role in
demonstrating that the fingerprint evidence was erroneous. Stephan
Cowans was convicted of attempted murder in 1997 for allegedly non-
fatally shooting a police officer, while fleeing a robbery in Roxbury,
Massachusetts. 20 5 He was implicated in the crime by the testimony of two
eyewitnesses, including the victim, and a fingerprint found on a cup. (The
perpetrator fled the scene, invaded a home, and held the family hostage for
around ten minutes. During that period, the perpetrator drank from a cup.)
Boston Police Department (BPD) latent print examiner Dennis LeBlanc
testified that he found sixteen corresponding ridge characteristics between
198 Michael Vigh, Evidence Bungled in Slaying, SALT LAKE TRm., Feb. 19, 2003, at Dl.
199 Id.
200 Matt Canham, Expert Killed in Gun-Lab Accident, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 3, 2003, at
1-A.
201 Id.
202 Vigh, supra note 198.
203 id.
204 id.
205 Commonwealth v. Cowans, 756 N.E.2d 622 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).
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the latent print from the cup and Cowans's known print.2 °6 LeBlanc
testified that the two prints were "identical" and that the latent print
belonged to Stephan Cowans.2°7 BPD latent print examiner Rosemary
McLaughlin verified the attribution. Cowans was sentenced to thirty to
forty-five years in prison.208  According to Cowans's attorney, Cowans
retained two former BPD fingerprint experts who agreed that he was the
209source of the latent print.
Cowans served six years in prison, volunteering for "biohazard" duty
in order to earn money for a post-conviction DNA test.210 Three DNA
samples recovered from the same mug that contained the latent print and
from a hat and sweatshirt discarded by the fleeing perpetrator all excluded
Cowans as the donor of the DNA. Based on the DNA evidence, the Boston
and State Police reexamined the fingerprint evidence and concluded that it
was erroneous. Cowans was freed in January 2004.11 Subsequent
investigation revealed the latent print actually belonged to one of the family
members who was held hostage. 12 Unlike the other cases discussed here,
criminal charges were brought against the latent print examiners involved.
An external review reported that LeBlanc had "discovered his mistake"
before trial "and concealed it all the way through trial. 213  However, a
grand jury declined to indict LeBlanc and McLaughlin.214 They were,
however, reassigned and suspended with pay. In an extraordinary move,
Police Commissioner Kathleen O'Toole shut down the entire BPD
206 Trial Transcript at 3-224, Cowans (No. 2000-P-52).
207 Id. at 3-225.
208 Jack Thomas, Two Police Officers are Put on Leave: Faulty Fingerprint Evidence is
Probed, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 24, 2004, at B 1.
209 Weber & Rothstein, supra note 10.
210 Flynn McRoberts & Steve Mills, U.S. Seeks Review of Fingerprint Techniques, High
Profile Errors Prompt Questions, CHI. TRiB., Feb. 21, 2005, at 1.
211 Saltzman & Daniel, supra note 5.
212 David S. Bernstein, The Jig Is Up, BOSTON PHOENIX, May 14, 2004, available at
http://www.bostonphoenix.com/bostonlnews-feature/other stories/multi 4/documents/0382
7954.asp. It was also reported that one of the "elimination" cards had been mislabeled.
According to a Suffolk County District Attorney's Office disclosure document obtained by
the Phoenix:
The name and signature on one of the fingerprint cards... were not the name and signature of
the individual from whom that particular set of elimination fingerprints had in fact been taken.
The set of fingerprints were in fact those of another individual from whom elimination
fingerprints had been taken (emphasis in original).
Id. It is not clear what relationship, if any, this mislabeling may have had with the
misattribution of the latent print.
213 McRoberts & Mills, supra note 210.
214 Maggie Mulvihill, No Charges vs. Hub Cops in Frame Case, BOSTON HERALD, June
24, 2004, at 2.
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fingerprint unit and turned latent work over to the state police.215
Allegations were made that Boston Police Identification Unit had long been
a "dumping ground" and "punishment duty" for troubled cops.
216
r. Mayfield
The most recent and best-known case in the U.S. is the Mayfield case
(see supra Introduction). Mayfield, an attorney in Portland, Orgeon, was a
Muslim convert and a U.S. Army veteran.217 He had once represented, in a
child-custody case, one of the "Portland Seven," who had pled guilty to
conspiracy to wage war against the United States.218 Even when Mayfield
was first arrested, it was known that the Spanish National Police were
uncertain about the identification.219 While FBI examiners identified fifteen
corresponding points of comparison, the Spanish could only find eight.220
Spain has a ten-point minimum standard.221 The FBI adheres to no set
standard for declaring a match.222 FBI examiners reportedly traveled to
Madrid to try to convince the Spanish that the identification was legitimate.
On this occasion, the FBI reportedly declined to examine the original
evidence and instead "relentlessly pressed their case anyway, explaining
away stark proof of a flawed link-including what the Spanish described as
tell-tale forensic signs-and seemingly refusing to accept the notion that
they were mistaken." 223  Further investigation showed that the FBI had
reprimanded Agent Massey for making false attributions in 1969 and
1974.224
215 Suzanne Smalley, Police Shutter Print Unit, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 14, 2004, at B 1.
216 Maggie Mulvihill & Franci Richardson, Unfit Cops Put in Key Evidence Unit,
BOSTON HERALD, May 6, 2004, at 2.
217 Karin J. Immergut, Application for Material Witness Order and Warrant Regarding
Witness: Brandon Bieri Mayfield, In re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings 03-01, 337 F. Supp.
2d 1218 (D. Or. 2004) (No. 04-MC-9071).
218 Id.
219 Richard B. Schmitt et al., Oregon Attorney Arrested Over Possible Ties to Spain
Bombings, L.A. TIMEs, May 7, 2004, at Al.
220 Spanish Investigators Question Fingerprint Analysis, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 8,
2004.
221 European Fingerprint Standards, 28 FiNGERPRINT WHORLD 19 (2002) (Reporting
fingerprint point standards ranging from 8 [Bulgaria] to 16 [Italy, Cyprus, Gibraltar] points,
as well as some countries with no set standard).
222 United States v. Liera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 566-71 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
[hereinafter Llera Plaza 11].
223 Sarah Kershaw, Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, N.Y. TIMEs, June
5, 2004, at Al.
224 David Heath, FBI's Handling of Fingerprint Case Criticized, SEATTLE TIMEs, June 1,
2004, at Al.
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4. Analysis of Known Cases of Misattribution
I compiled the above twenty-two reported cases of misattribution using
conservative selection criteria. Although there is no information on how
many times latent print identification has been used in crime investigation,
the number is clearly large, and twenty-two cases pale in comparison.
Some might even go so far as to suggest that this figure is so small that the
characterization of the error rate of latent print identification as zero is
warranted. However, before doing so, we need to understand the problem
of exposure. That is, are these twenty-two cases the full complement of
actual cases of latent print misattribution (or close to the full complement),
or are they merely the tip of the iceberg? The following analyses will
indicate why the latter is more likely the case.
a. Temporal trends
The first reason to believe that the known cases of misattribution do
not account for all actual cases of misattribution is their distribution over
time (Figure 1). Clearly, misattributions are clustered in recent years and
appear to be occurring at an accelerating rate. One possible explanation for
this is that the quality of latent print analysis is degrading. This might be
225because training is being eroded by budget cuts or by computerization.
Or, perhaps latent print examiners have becoming increasingly complacent,
and hence sloppy.
Complacency, however, seems unlikely. Although fingerprint
examiners are not legal scholars and may not have been immediately aware
of the import of the Daubert ruling in 1993, the fact that the case might
stimulate heightened scrutiny from the defense bar has been in the legal
literature since at least 1997 .226 The challenge to the admissibility of
fingerprint evidence in United States v. Mitchell in 1999 was very well
publicized within the fingerprint profession.227 If the perceived level of
defense, judicial, and media scrutiny is a measure of examiner vigilance,
then latent print examiners should have been at their most vigilant since the
first two decades of the twentieth century during the period after 1999. And
yet, that period contains some of the most embarrassing cases of
misattribution.
225 See David L. Grieve, The Identification Process: Traditions in Training, 40 J.
FoRENsIc IDENTIFICATION 195, 210-11 (1990).
226 See, e.g., David A. Stoney, Fingerprint Identification: Scientific Status, in MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 27-2 (David L.
Faigman et al. eds., 1997).




A more plausible explanation is that misattributions are being brought
to the public's attention at a higher rate. There is little doubt that the
growing controversy over the validity of forensic fingerprint identification
after Mitchell has made fingerprint misattributions more newsworthy. A
glance at the sources, infra Part II.A.3, reveals that the earlier cases appear
in legal and scholarly literature, but not in the press, whereas the opposite is
generally true of the more recent cases.
If the apparent increase in misattribution is actually an increase in
exposure, the temporal trend is disturbing. Misattributions have been
exposed at a rate of more than one per year, during a period in which latent
print examiners are well aware that they are under greater scrutiny than any
other time since the introduction of the technique.
b. Offense characteristics
An analysis of the offenses implicated in the known cases of
misattribution gives even stronger reason to doubt that actual cases of
misattribution are limited to this data set. Figure 2 shows the distribution of
offenses in the known cases data set. The overrepresentation of very
serious crimes is striking. More than half of the misattributions occurred in
homicide cases (murder, murder investigation [Hatfield, McKie], or
terrorist attacks). Sixty-eight percent involved very serious crimes
(homicide, attempted homicide, or rape). If the cases in which the offense
is unknown are removed (Figure 3), the figures are comparable. Sixty
percent of cases involve murder or attempted murder; seventy-five percent
involve very serious crimes.
Since homicide accounts for only around one percent of the total
number of felony charges, 228 it is clearly overrepresented among the known
cases of disputed identification. Moreover, since I have combined cases for
the United States and the United Kingdom, where the murder rate is one
fifth that of the U.S., 229 this significantly understates the overrepresentation
of errors in homicide cases.
It may be thought that this overrepresentation may be explained by the
greater likelihood of using fingerprint evidence in homicide cases, as
opposed to other criminal investigations. We can test this hypothesis.
228 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL CASE
PROCESSING STATISTICS, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cases.htm (last updated
Sept. 28, 2004).
229 PATRICK LANGAN & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1981-96, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/cjusew96/cpp.htm.
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Professor Peterson et al. collected detailed data on the use of forensic
evidence in a representative sample of adult serious crime cases in four
American cities230 from 1976-l980.231 Table 2 shows that fingerprint
evidence is indeed more likely to be recovered in homicide cases than in
other criminal investigations, including burglary. However, the difference
is not great enough to explain the overrepresentation of misattributions in
murder cases. For example, homicide accounts for 54% of the
misattributions, burglary (a crime for which it is plausible to think the use
of fingerprint evidence would be common) only 18%. And yet, although
fingerprint evidence is recovered in around 40% of homicide cases, it is
also recovered in around 24% of burglary cases.
Another possible explanation is that misattributions are far more likely
to occur in homicide cases than in less serious offenses like robbery,
burglary, and drug offenses. It is possible that the pressure to close a
homicide case leads latent print examiners to "push the envelope" further in
these cases, elevating the potential for a misattribution.
A third possible explanation is that misattributions occur at the same
rate in homicide cases and other cases but are more likely to be publicly
exposed in cases involving very serious crimes because of the increased
attention focused on those cases by media, defense counsel and experts, and
other actors. If this were the sole explanation, it would suggest that-even
accounting for the greater prevalence of fingerprint evidence in homicide
cases-if misattributions in felony cases were exposed at the same rate as in
homicide cases, there might be around 600 exposed cases of misattribution
(this still excludes the "dark figure" of unexposed cases).
2 32
Is the overrepresentation of homicide cases in exposed cases of
fingerprint misattribution a consequence of examiner overzealousness or
more efficient exposure mechanisms? As Professor Gross has commented
in another, though related, context, "the truth is probably a combination of
these two appalling possibilities. 233  In its report on the Mayfield case,
however, the FBI has opted for the former explanation. The report
concludes that "the inherent pressure of working an extremely high-profile
case.., was thought to have influenced the examiner's initial judgment and
230 The cities were Peoria, Chicago, Kansas City, and Oakland. Joseph L. Peterson et al.,
Forensic Evidence and the Police, 1976-1980, NAT'L ARCHIVE OF CRIM. JUST. DATA, Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Study No. 8186 (1985).
231 Id.
232 If homicide is 1% of felony cases, 12 homicide misattributions times 99 equals 1188.
This figure is then divided by two to account for the greater prevalence of fingerprint
evidence in homicide cases.
233 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J.
CPilM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 533 (2004).
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subsequent examination., 234  Similarly, the report concludes that the
verification process was tainted "because of the inherent pressure of such a
high-profile case" and recommends that "[a] new quality assurance rule is
needed regarding high-profile or high-pressure cases."
2 35
c. The fortuity of exposed cases
Perhaps the strongest evidence that the known cases of misattribution
only represent the tip of the iceberg is the fortuity of the exposure of cases
of misattribution. Only in 27% of the cases of misattribution could the
exposure be said to have occurred in the routine process of a criminal trial,
usually through the efforts of defense experts.236 In two cases (Chiory and
Manchester)2 37 there is not enough information to determine how the error
was exposed. In 63% of the cases, extraordinary circumstances were
required to expose the fact that misattributions had occurred. The Loomis
print was disputed during his trial, but he was convicted; the identification
was only retracted during a second trial that Loomis had won on unrelated
grounds.238 The Caldwell error was only exposed during the trial of a co-
conspirator.239 Had the co-conspirator died, plea-bargained, had charges
dropped, or not mounted a vigorous defense, the error would never have
been exposed. The Lee error was brought to light by the confession of the
true perpetrator, always a fortuitous and highly unlikely event.240  The
McNamee error was exposed during the course of vigorous appeals and
reinvestigations undertaken over the course of eleven years.241
The McKie case involved the prosecution of a police officer with an
extremely supportive father who was also a police officer and the
extraordinary last-minute intervention of American fingerprint examiners in
a Scottish case. That a former police officer would be driven to the brink of
suicide and into depression by her efforts to contest fingerprint evidence, 42
suggests something of the uphill battle faced by a criminal defendant who
has fewer material and psychological resources with fingerprint evidence
being adduced against them.
234 Stacey, supra note 47, at 713.
235 Id. at 713, 716.
236 See infra Table 1.
237 See David Grey, Yard in Fingerprint Blunder, SUNDAY TIMEs (London), Apr. 6,
1997; Fingerprint Blunder 'Ruined My Life', MANCHESTER NEWS (Eng.), July 12, 2001.
238 See supra Part II(A)(2)(i).
239 See supra Part II(A)(2)(ii).
240 See supra Part II(A)(2)(vii).
241 See supra Part II(A)(2)(x).
242 Damien Henderson, Expert Highlights McKie Case 'Errors', HERALD (Glasgow,
Scot.), Sept. 21, 2004, at 8; Specter, supra note 154.
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The Manchester Case was exposed only because the suspect had an
alibi and did not match the physical description. The Hatfield error was
exposed by the highly unusual circumstance of a supposedly identified
corpse turning up alive. The Valken-Leduc error was exposed by a new
review of the evidence, occasioned by a bizarre, fatal laboratory accident.243
In addition, many of the cases were exposed by "cascading"-the
exposure of one disputed attribution generated scrutiny that would not
otherwise have occurred. This scrutiny, in turn, revealed further cases of
disputed attributions. A defense motion for discovery of the fingerprint
evidence, which prompted the exposure of the Basden error, may be the
normal course of business. (I have coded it as normal.) But, even if it is,
the three additional Fayetteville cases would probably never have been
exposed were it not for the exposure of the Basden error. The Asbury error
was exposed only through the attention generated by the McKie error. And,
Wallace and "Manchester" were only exposed after journalists began
investigating the McNamara case.244
Fingerprint evidence is so powerful that erroneous fingerprint evidence
is likely to convict, convict securely, and never be exposed.245 In most
cases, extraordinary circumstances are necessary to expose a fingerprint
misattribution. Consider, for example, the Cowans case.246 Imagine that
the perpetrator were not so obliging as to have (1) druk from a cup, while
fleeing the crime, and (2) discarded two items of clothing containing his
DNA at the scene. Had the perpetrator not done those two things it is
virtually certain that Cowans would have served his full sentence of thirty-
five years without anyone ever knowing that the fingerprint evidence (and
the eyewitness evidence) was erroneous.241 Cowans's exoneration (and the
exposure of the fingerprint misattribution) also required the retention and
preservation of the evidence containing the DNA for six years and the
willingness of a court to order post-conviction DNA testing. Stephan
Cowans himself expressed this most poignantly after his exoneration when
he remarked to a reporter "that the evidence against him was so
243 See supra Part II.A.3.p.
244 Supra note 187 and accompanying text.
245 Tamara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie? Re-Weighing Fingerprint Evidence in
Criminal Jury Trials, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2003) ("From my practical experience and
scholarly research of the topic, the reliability of fingerprint identification evidence routinely
goes unquestioned at all levels of the criminal process and by both sides of the litigation,
prosecution, and defense.").
246 See supra Part II.A.3.q.




overwhelming that if he had been on the jury, he would have voted to
convict himself.,
248
Similarly, consider the Mayfield case. Only the stubborn resistance of
the Spanish National Police to apparently intense pressure from the FBI
exposed the error. Imagine the Mayfield latent being discovered on U.S.
soil. As a terrorist case, the print probably would have gone directly to the
FBI. No other agency would have looked at it. With the Spanish National
Police out of the picture, the error might never have been exposed. Even
Mayfield's own expert corroborated the erroneous match. Now imagine the
Mayfield latent being discovered on U.S. soil and being initially examined
by a local law enforcement agency, rather than by the Spanish National
Police. Would a local U.S. law enforcement agency have withstood as well
the pressure that the FBI apparently applied to the Spanish National Police?
Even in those circumstances, it seems highly unlike that the Mayfield error
would ever have been exposed. Finally, there is the role of the media in
bringing the Mayfield identification to light. The Mayfield case was
publicized prematurely because of press leaks in Europe.249  From the
earliest reports of Mayfield's arrest, it was reported that the Spanish police
entertained doubts about the fingerprint evidence.2 0  Had the leak not
occurred, the Mayfield error might have been resolved behind closed doors
and never made public. FBI latent print examiners might still be claiming,
in sworn testimony, never to have made a misattribution.
251
The high degree of fortuity associated with the known cases of
disputed attribution further strengthens the likelihood that known cases
represent only a small portion of actual cases of error and that the "dark
figure" of unknown cases is likely to be significantly higher than the "light
figure" of known cases.
It may, of course, be argued that each one of the known cases of
misattribution demonstrates that "the system works," precisely because it
has become known to us. 252 In a case, such as Jackson, where reputable
defense experts offered clear and explicit testimony that the attribution was
erroneous, this is a plausible argument (though, since the jury convicted
anyway, Jackson certainly diminishes our faith that the criminal justice
248 Thomas, supra note 208.
249 Crombie & Zaitz, supra note 3.
250 Richard B. Schmitt et al., Oregon Attorney Arrested Over Possible Ties to Spain
Bombings, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at Al.
251 See, e.g., infra note 325 and accompanying text.
252 This is similar to an argument made in the debate over wrongful convictions: that the
exposure of wrongful convictions, even hours before the planned execution of an innocent
person, represents that "the system working." See Lawrence C. Marshall, Do Exonerations
Prove That the 'The System Works'?, 86 JUDICATURE 83 (2002).
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system "works"). But the majority of misattributions were not exposed
through such routine reviews. Moreover, the "system works" argument
puts those with fingerprint evidence adduced against them in a double bind:
if errors are not exposed, latent print examiners claim that latent print
identification is infallible; if errors are exposed, latent print examiners claim
that their mechanisms for detecting errors "work."
d. Safeguards against misattribution
The misattributions data set demonstrates that none of the supposed
safeguards against misattribution is immune from failure. For example,
some courts have held that "verification" provides a safeguard against
error.253 Latent print examiners have argued that competence is a safeguard
against error.254  It has also been argued that a high "point standard"-
requiring a certain (high) number of matching ridge characteristics in order
to declare a match-protects against misattribution.255 Most persuasively, it
has been argued that defense experts provide a safeguard against false
attributions.256 Even within this relatively small data set, misattributions
have been known to occur when each of the aforementioned safeguards is
in place.
For example, the misattributions data set demonstrates that verification
does not prevent misattributions. Erroneous identifications were verified by
one examiner in Caldwell, at least one examiner in Cooper, two examiners
in Chiory, several examiners in McNamee, two examiners in the
Manchester Case, three examiners in both McKie and Asbury, two
examiners in Jackson, one examiner in Cowans, and two examiners in
253 United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Meager also testified
that the error rate for fingerprint comparison is essentially zero. Though conceding that a
small margin of error exists because of differences in individual examiners, he opined that
this risk is minimized because print identifications are typically confirmed through peer
review."); United States v. Rogers, 26 Fed. Appx. 171, 173 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished
decision) ("[T]he possibility of error was mitigated in this case by having two experts
independently review the evidence.").
254 Pat A. Wertheim, Scientific Comparison and Identification of Fingerprint Evidence,
16 PRIwT 1, 6 (2000), available at http://www.scafo.org/ThePrintTHEPRINTVOL_
16_ISSUE_05.pdf [hereinafter Wertheim, Scientific Comparison] ("Erroneous
identifications among cautious, competent examiners, thankfully, are exceedingly rare; some
might say 'impossible."').
255 Lamboume, supra note 56, at 228.
256 Ed German, Regarding Recent News Articles on Fingerprint Evidence Credibility in
Court (2002), available at http://onin.com/fp/stmt ref articles.html ("In a worst-case
scenario involving an incompetent expert, Defense can easily locate their own expert. And,




Mayfield. Indeed, more than half (12/22) of the known misattributions
were attested to by more than one examiner. This supports that argument,
posited by Haber and Haber, that, if "verification" is not conducted blind,
the "verifier" is more likely to ratify misattributions than detect them.
257
These findings are particularly important because "quality assurance" and
"quality control" (QA/QC) are increasingly invoked as the basis for
confidence in the reliability of latent print identification. 58 These findings
show that existing quality control measures do not appear to be particularly
effective at detecting fingerprint misattributions.
Similarly, the data set refutes the notion that certified latent print
examiners do not make errors. Caldwell was erroneously identified by
three IAI-certified examiners. Midwestern involved an IAI-certified
examiner, as did Jackson. Valken-Leduc was erroneously identified by the
Chair of IAI Latent Print Certification Board. In fact, nearly one-third
(7/22) of the total number of American 259 examiners implicated in disputed
identifications after IAI certification was instituted in 1977260 were IAI-
certified.261  Given that only a small (though unknown) percentage of
practicing latent print examiners are IAI-certified, IAI-certified examiners
carry a surprisingly high proportion of the responsibility for disputed
identifications. This suggests that the misattribution rate for IAI-certified
examiners may be equal to, or even greater than, that for non-certified
examiners. It is possible that certified examiners are more overconfident in
making marginal attributions.
The data also show that a high point standard is insufficient to protect
against misattribution. Of the twelve cases in the data set for which the
number of supposed matching ridge characteristics is known, in fully half
of those cases the misattribution was made with at least sixteen points.
Sixteen points has historically been considered a very exacting standard.262
257 Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Error Rates for Human Fingerprint Examiners,
in AuToMATIc FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 339, 349 (Nalini K. Ratha & Ruud M.
Bolle eds., 2003).
258 See, e.g., United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002);
Christophe Champod, Fingerprints: Standards of Proof, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC
SCIENCES 884, 889 (Jay A. Siegel et al. eds., 2000).
259 IAI-certification is virtually unknown outside the United States. Only three of the
approximately 800 IAI-certified examiners are located outside the United States. See Int'l
Ass'n for Identification, Certified Latent Print Examiners, at http://onin.com/clpe/
clpebystate_27nov2004.pdf (last updated Nov. 27, 2004).
260 Certification for Latent Fingerprint Examiners, 27 IDENTIFICATION NEWS 3 (1977).
261 It should be noted that three of the examiners counted as non-certified in calculating
this figure were "FBI certified." If we include both IAI and FBI certification, then 45% of
American examiners implicated in misattributions after 1977 were certified.
262 Cole, What Counts for Identity?, supra note 65, at 157; European Fingerprint
[Vol. 951024
2005] ERROR IN LATENT FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION
Three-quarters of the cases had at least fourteen points, and none of the
cases involved fewer than eleven points.
Perhaps most surprisingly, the data show that even the provision of
defense experts does not protect a criminal defendant against
misidentification. In four cases (Caldwell, McKie, Cowans, and Mayfield),
disputed identifications were corroborated by independent experts. As will
be discussed further below, that independent experts would corroborate
erroneous attributions suggests that the underlying cause of misattributions
runs very deep indeed.
e. Post-conviction DNA exonerations
It might be argued that the low number of fingerprint misattributions in
the set of post-conviction DNA exonerations, collected and analyzed by the
Innocence Project (IP) is evidence of the high accuracy of latent print
identification. Fingerprint misattribution has been implicated in only one of
the 155 cases of post-conviction DNA exoneration (the Cowans case).263 In
other words, approximately 0.6% of wrongful convictions exposed by post-
conviction DNA testing were caused, in part, by fingerprint misattribution.
By comparison, twenty-one (16%) of the first seventy wrongful convictions
exposed by post-conviction DNA testing were caused, in part, by
microscopic hair comparison and forty (57%) at least in part by serological
evidence.264 If we could extrapolate these findings to the total innocence
project data set, which now stands at 155 cases, we would expect around
forty-two cases involving microscopic hair comparison and eighty cases
involving serology.
From this data, one might be tempted to conclude that fingerprint
evidence is around forty-two times more reliable than microscopic hair
comparison and around eighty times more trustworthy than serology.
However, before reaching any such conclusion, we would need to control
for the relative likelihood with which someone falsely convicted on these
three types of evidence would be exonerated by post-conviction DNA
testing. It is possible that a fingerprint misattribution is less likely to be
Standards, supra note 221 (reporting fingerprint point standards ranging from eight points
[Bulgaria] to sixteen points [Italy, Cyprus, Gibraltar], as well as some countries with no set
standard).
263 The Innocence Project, Causes & Remedies, at http://www.innocenceproject.org/
causes/index.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2005). This data set is itself fortuitously generated.
Inclusion in it requires a sequence of unlikely events, including: a crime that produces
biological evidence, failure to test the biological evidence upon initial investigation,
preservation of biological evidence after conviction, and willingness of the court and/or state




exposed by post-conviction DNA testing than a serology inclusion or
microscopic hair comparison. Although this is a difficult estimate to make,
Professor Peterson et al. 's data set 2 65 can again be used to make provisional
estimate. Peterson et al. enumerate the recovery of different types of
forensic evidence in each case in their data set.266
As Table 3 shows, 86% of cases in which hair evidence was recovered
also had biological evidence. In contrast, only 29% of cases in which latent
print evidence was recovered also had biological evidence. In short, a
defendant with false microscopic hair comparison evidence against him
would be around three times more likely to have biological evidence
available for post-conviction DNA testing than a defendant with false
fingerprint evidence adduced against him. These figures are probably
conservative because mitochondrial DNA can be extracted from hair, even
very old hair.267 In contrast, although it is now possible, in the laboratory,
to extract DNA from a fingerprint,268 this has not been done in the field, and
it would certainly not be possible with a fingerprint that has aged in an
evidence locker. Since serological evidence is by definition biological
evidence, a defendant with false serological evidence adduced against him
would be around 3.5 times more likely to have biological evidence
available for post-conviction DNA testing than a defendant with false
fingerprint evidence adduced against him.
These figures do not, of course, fully explain the greater presence of
microscopic hair comparison and serology in the IP data set. But they do
suggest that the reason there are fewer fingerprint cases than microscopic
hair comparison or serology cases is not solely that fingerprint evidence is
more accurate evidence. Rather, these figures suggest that the error rate for
microscopic hair comparison may be around fourteen times that of
fingerprint evidence. That is scant reason for comfort because microscopic
hair comparison is widely considered to be very bad evidence indeed.269
265 See supra note 230.
266 Since post-conviction DNA testing generally consists of doing DNA analysis of
biological evidence that was not DNA tested during the original investigation, it is
appropriate to view cases from Peterson et al.'s data collection period (1976-1980) in which
biological evidence was collected as a reasonable proxy for cases that would have been
eligible for post-conviction exoneration through DNA testing. In my analysis, I am counting
as "biological evidence" the following codes from Peterson et al.'s data: "perspiration,"
"saliva," "urine," "vaginal, "feces," "biological, other," "semen," and "misc. organic."
267 See, e.g., Anne C. Stone et al., Mitochondrial DNA Analysis of the Presumptive
Remains of Jesse James, 46 J. FORENSIC Sci. 173 (2001).
268 See Ashira Zamir et al., Fingerprints and DNA: STR Typing of DNA Extracted from
Adhesive Tape after Processing for Fingerprints, 45 J. FORENSIC Sci. 687 (2000).
269 Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analysis:
Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 CoLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV.
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Although existing data on error rates for forensic techniques is
extremely poor, estimates for the false positive rate for microscopic hair
comparison range from 4% to 35%.270 Similarly, we might conclude that
the error rate for traditional serological evidence may be around twenty-
three times that of fingerprint evidence. Again, serological evidence is
notoriously unreliable.2 7' These figures would suggest error rates for
fingerprint identification ranging from 0.2% to 2.5%.272 Given the
acknowledged weaknesses in the studies that generated these false positive
rates,273 these should be regarded as lower bounds of the actual error rate.274
227 (1996).
270 Houck and Budowle found a false positive rate of 11% or 35%, depending on how
one calculates the false positive rate. Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the
Picture, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 1047, 1058 (2003); Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle,
Correlation of Microscopic and Mitochondrial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI.
964, 966 (2002); D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, A House with No Foundation, 20
IssuEs IN Sci. & TECH. 35, 38-39 (2003). But Houck disputes that characterization of their
findings, interestingly, by refusing to afford epistemic privilege to a mitochondrial DNA
profile. In other words, he refuses to interpret an exclusion under mitochondrial DNA as
definitive proof that a microscopic hair comparison inclusion was, in fact, erroneous. Max
M. Houck, Forensic Science, No Consensus, 20 IssuEs N ScI. & TECH. 6, 7 (2004)
("Microscopical and mitochondrial DNA analyses of human hairs yield very different but
complimentary results, and one method should not be seen as 'screening for' or 'confirming'
the other."). Professors Peterson and Markham found that microscopic hair comparison had
a false positive rate of approximately 4%. Joseph L. Peterson & Penelope N. Markham,
Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, 1978-1991, H: Resolving Questions of
Common Origin, 40 J. FoRENsIC SCI. 1009, 1022-23 (1995).
271 SCHECK ET AL., supra note 68, at 45-52; Randolph Jonakait, Forensic Science: The
Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 109, 121 (1991) ("[C]rime labs must be
making thousand upon thousands of mistaken physiological fluid analyses each year.").
Peterson and Markham found serology false positive rates ranging from 5-7%. Peterson &
Markham, supra note 270, at 1014.
272 0.04/14 = 0.003; 0.35/14 = 0.025; 0.05/23 = 0.002; 0.07/23 = 0.003.
273 Jonakait, supra note 271, at 121 n.44.
274 It should also be noted that using exposed wrongful convictions to estimate the false
positive error rate of a forensic technique may risk underestimating the false positive rate
because it would fail to detect false positive errors in which the falsely identified individual
was in fact guilty of the crime. In a sense, this method fails to account for what might be
called the "baserate" of guilt-the rate at which a forensic examiner would be correct if she
simply attributed every crime scene sample to the prime suspect.
For example, imagine that 80% of prime suspects are guilty (the baserate of guilt). A
forensic examiner could be "correct" 80% of the time, without doing any analysis at all,
simply by always attributing crime scene samples to the prime suspect.
Now imagine an examiner who does do analysis. We can try to use exposed cases of
actual innocence to estimate her false positive rate, but we may underestimate because 80%
of cases are ineligible to become cases of actual innocence. But the examiner may have
committed false positives in those cases.
In short, one reason that the number of exposed cases of latent print misattribution is
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It should be noted, as well, that while these percentages may sound small,
they would amount to thousands of fingerprint misattributions. And,
because fingerprint evidence is much more persuasive, far better trusted,
and presented to the jury in much stronger terms than microscopic hair
comparison or serology ever were, fingerprint errors are probably far more
likely to result in wrongful convictions and to go undetected if they do. If
these error rates are taken as lower bounds of the actual error rate of these
techniques, the IP data set suggests that the error rate of latent print
identification, while significantly lower than that of microscopic hair
comparison or serology, is not insignificant.
B. SIMULATIONS
As I have argued more fully elsewhere, the fingerprint community has
thus far failed to conduct meaningful well-designed simulations intended to
capture their potential error rate. The principal reason for this, I have
argued, is that courts have allowed them to testify to extraordinarily
powerful conclusions without adducing any results from such
simulations. 75 Legally, latent print examiners can only lose by conducting
simulations that indicate a non-zero error rate.
Nonetheless, some poor simulations have been conducted, and it may
be possible to use them to say something about the probable error rate of
forensic fingerprint identification.
1. Proficiency tests
Proficiency tests of latent print examiners have been conducted since
1983. The purpose of proficiency tests is to measure the competence of
individual laboratories or techniques; their intent is not to generate an
estimate of the accuracy of latent print identification. Nonetheless,
proficiency tests are simulations; the correct answer is known to the test-
maker, and it is possible to measure the number of correct and incorrect
responses. It, therefore, may be possible to infer something about the
relatively low may be that the baserate of guilt is relatively high. Latent print identification
may not be all that discriminating, but it may appear to perform fairly well simply by
attributing latent prints to the prime suspect. On baserates, see Michael J. Saks & D.
Michael Risinger, Baserates, the Presumption of Guilt, Admissibility Rulings, and Erroneous
Convictions, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1051. I am grateful to Stephen Fienberg for
emphasizing this point.
275 Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Ruling from
Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1189, 1189 (2004)
[hereinafter Cole, Grandfathering Evidence]; Simon A. Cole, Is Fingerprint Identification
Valid? Rhetorics of Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents' Discourse, L. & POL'Y
(forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
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accuracy of forensic fingerprint identification from existing proficiency
tests data.
a. Externally conducted proficiency tests
By "externally conducted" proficiency tests, I mean those tests
designed and administered by an institution with a modicum of
independence from the crime laboratory itself. Although there may be
reasons to question the independence of such institutions as the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, the American Society of Crime
Laboratory Directors Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD-LAB), and
Collaborative Testing Services (a private corporation one of whose clients
is ASCLD-LAB), externally conducted tests are nonetheless distinguishable
from "internally conducted" tests, in which an individual laboratory designs
and administers a proficiency test to itself
Beginning in 1981, a series of proficiency tests were conducted for
latent print examiners.276 The tests were administered by a private
company, Collaborative Testing Services (CTS). Beginning in 1993, the
tests were designed in consultation with the Proficiency Advisory
Committee (PAC) of the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors
(ASCLD).
There are a number of difficulties interpreting these tests. First, there
are design flaws in the tests themselves. The tests were conducted by mail
under unproctored, untimed conditions.277 It is not known whether the tests
were completed by individual examiners or "by committee." Second, no
metric exists for measuring the degree of difficulty of the latent print
comparison. Even the number of "points of identification" in a latent print
cannot serve as such a metric. This is because studies have found that there
can be substantial disagreement between examiners as to how many
"points" exist in a particular print.278 In addition, it has been argued that the
number of points in a latent print is not an accurate measure of the degree of
difficulty of the analysis of that print. Therefore, there is no way of
determining the level of difficulty of these proficiency tests relative to
casework. Third, there is incomplete information about the level of
276 Peterson & Markham, supra note 270, at 1009.
277 Id; COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVICES, INC., LATENT PRINTS EXAMINATION REPORT
Nos. 9508, 9608, 9708, 9808, 99-516, 01-516, 02-516, 02-517, 03-516 (1995-2003), reports
from 2001-2003 available at http://www.collaborativetesting.com/forensics/
forensicsreports.html (summaries or complete reports on file with the author).
278I. W. Evett & R. L. Williams, A Review of the Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in
England and Wales, 46 J. FoRENsIc IDENTIFICATION 49, 51 (1996). But see Glenn M.
Langenburg, Pilot Study: A Statistical Analysis of the ACE-V Methodology-Analysis Stage,
54 J. FoRENsic IDENTIFICATION 64, 76 (2004).
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experience and qualifications of the examiners who completed the tests.
Fourth, the number of "elimination latents," or latent prints that should not
be attributed to any of the known prints provided, is relatively small. This
may mitigate the difficulty of these tests.
Another set of criticisms against the proficiency studies has been
launched by the fingerprint community itself. Proponents of fingerprinting
contend that, since there are no controls of who takes the test, many of the
tests represent the work of novice examiners or foreign laboratories.279
Therefore, they argue that the false positive rate may be higher on
proficiency tests than in real casework. On the other hand, critics of
fingerprinting argue that test-takers tend to overperform on non-blind
proficiency tests, so proficiency test error rates may be lower than the rate
on real casework.280 In short, the proficiency test results may either
underestimate or overestimate the true false positive rate. All we know for
certain is that they should be interpreted with caution.
Table 4 shows the results of all known external proficiency tests to
date. There are a number of different ways of reporting false positives.
Often the false positive rate has been reported as the number of participants
who committed at least one false positive divided by the total number of
participants. This is what has led to the oft-quoted "one in five error rate"
on the 1995 test.
281
Another way of reporting false positives is to divide the number of
false positives by the total number of comparisons undertaken. For
example, for the 1995 test, the rate of false positives over the total number
of comparisons is 4.4%. Though the latter figure would seem more
comforting, it would indicate false fingerprint testimony against almost one
out of every twenty criminal defendants.
Since the notorious 1995 test, there has been a decline in false
positives. Because there is no metric for measuring test difficulty, however,
it cannot be determined whether the decline is due to changing makeup of
the test-taking population, greater seriousness with which the tests are
treated, better performance, or easier tests. Overall, the comparison false
positive rate, aggregated over the entire test-taking period is around 0.8%.
279 Testimony of Stephen Meagher & Kenneth Smith, United States v. Llera Plaza, 188
F. Supp. 2d 549, 566 (E.D. Pa. 2002) [hereinafter Llera Plaza II]; Glenn Langenburg,
Defending Against the Critic's Curse (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.clpex.com/
Articles/CriticsCurse.htn.
280 Haber & Haber, supra note 257, at 339.
281 David L. Grieve, Possession of Truth, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 521 (1996)
(describing "shock" and "disbelief' "within the forensic science community" at the results of
the 1995 test); James E. Starrs, Forensic Science on the Ropes: Procellous Times in the
Citadels of Infallibility, 20 ScI. SLEUTHING REv. 1 (Winter 1996).
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In addition, Doctors Haber and Haber have pointed out that all the
external proficiency tests are mailed to laboratories and mailed back, so it is
possible that many of them are completed by committee. In that case, each
reported laboratory false positive may represent one or more false positives
committed at the level of the individual examiner. Using a conservative
estimate that each laboratory false positive represents two individual false
positives (some may represent three or more, some only one), the Habers'
"consensus error rate" is given as the square root of the "comparison error
rate. 282
Finally, it should be noted that signal detection theorists would point
out an important problem with reporting only the false positive rate. Test-
takers who are far more concerned about false positives than false negatives
can in effect, "game" the test by reporting with extreme conservatism. For
example, imagine an examiner who reported "inconclusive" for every test
item. This examiner would score perfectly in my schema that reports only
false positives. Therefore, signal detection theory must be applied in order
to measure not just false positives, but the test-takers' power of
discrimination. However, the reported data on fingerprint proficiency tests
are insufficient to apply signal detection theory.283
b. Internally conducted proficiency tests
In the 2002 case United States v. Llera Plaza, the court issued a
decision restricting the testimony of FBI latent print examiners, in part
because although existing studies "fall far short of establishing a 'scientific'
rate of error, they are (modestly) suggestive of a discernible level of
practitioner error., 284 This marked the first time a judicial decision has so
limited the testimony of latent print examiners. The court then granted the
government's motion for reconsideration, and a hearing was held in which
the government presented results of proficiency testing conducted since
1995. The evidence included the FBI's results on the CTS tests described
in Part II.B. 1.a, revealing that an FBI examiner was responsible for one of
the false positives on the 1995 CTS test. The government also presented
results of internal proficiency tests designed and administered by the FBI
since 1995. The results of these internal proficiency tests had not been
282 Haber & Haber, supra note 257, at 346.
283 Victoria L. Phillips et al., The Application of Signal Detection Theory to Decision-
Making in Forensic Science, 46 J. FORENSIC Sci. 294, 295 (2001). I am grateful to John R.
Vokey for clarification of this point.




published or otherwise made public in any way until the adverse ruling in
Llera Plaza.
Table 5 shows the results of the FBI's internal proficiency tests.
Clearly, FBI examiners performed quite well on these tests, committing
only three false negatives and no false positives. However, upon closer
examination two concerns emerged. First,'although, as mentioned above, it
is not possible to measure the difficulty of latent print comparison except
subjectively, a subjective examination suggested that the tests were far
easier than typical latent casework. Retired Scotland Yard examiner Allan
Bayle testified that the simulated latent prints in the test were "nothing like"
typical crime-scene latent prints,285 that Scotland Yard examiners would
"fall about laughing" if given the FBI's tests,286 and that the tests were "a
joke. 287
Bayle's conclusions about the difficulty of the tests went uncontested,
and they were credited by the court, which remarked, "[o]n the record made
before me, the FBI examiners got very high proficiency grades, but the tests
they took did not., 288  If, as discussed infra Part III.A, the FBI really
believes that its examiners' false positive rate is zero, it is difficult to
understand why they would not administer to them the most difficult tests
possible.
The second issue concerned collusion on the tests. A four-page
memorandum written by an FBI examiner echoed Bayle's concerns about
the test being easy, but also claimed "that examiners routinely cheat on the
test by discussing their answers with one another.,
289
2. IAI Certification Examination
Another simulation is a certifying examination administered by the
International Association for Identification (IAI). Certification is a
voluntary qualification available to latent print examiners; no U.S. court has
ever ruled that certification is required to qualify a latent print examiner to
testify, and the IAI explicitly disavows any such interpretation of its
285 Trial Transcript at 38, Llera Plaza II (Nos. 98-CR00362-10, 98-CR00362-11, 98-
CR00362-12) (testimony of Allan Bayle, retired Scotland Yard examiner).
286 Id. at 55.
287 Id. at 74.
288 United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
289 David Heath, Bungled Fingerprints Expose Problems at FBI, SEATTLE TIMES, June 7,
2004, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.comihtml/localnews/2001949987_
fmgerprint07m.html. This article also reports efforts to pressure the examiner to rewrite the
memorandum without the charges of collusion because of its legal discoverability. Id.
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certification program.29° Certification requires passage of an examination
that includes a section that requires making source attributions for fifteen
latent prints.291  Haber and Haber report that almost all failures of the
certification examination result from failing this section.292 To be certified,
a candidate must correctly attribute twelve of the fifteen test items without
incorrectly attributing any test item (that is, the candidate is allowed three
false negatives, but no false positives).293 One response to this test design
would be attribute only the twelve easiest comparison and give no answer
for the three most difficult.294 This would mean that the test is only
measuring examiners' ability to attribute the twelve easiest prints. The pass
rate of the first examination, in 1993, was 48%, and the rate of failures has
stayed steady at around half.
295
Since the IAI does not publish the results of the examination, and the
general figure of 50% failure does not parse out how many of these derive
from false positives, as opposed to more than three false negatives, it is
impossible to extrapolate a general error rate from the IAI certifying
examination. Nonetheless, it is troubling to realize that, given that virtually
all certification candidates are likely to be active latent print examiners,
around half of this self-selected group of latent print examiners cannot pass
the IAI certification examination. Moreover, the least competent examiners
are not likely to even submit to the examination.
C. SUMMARY
The existing data are inadequate to calculate a meaningful error rate
for forensic fingerprint identification. Nonetheless, it is clear that
misidentifications do occur: in real-life criminal case, on internally and
externally administered proficiency tests, and on the IAI certification
examination.
290 Chicago Fingerprint Forum Recommendations, 52 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 643,
644 (2002); James R. McConnell, Certification (To Be or Not to Be), 42 J. FORENsIC
IDENTIFICATION 205, 206 (1992); Wertheim, re: Certification, supra note 48, at 279-80.
291 Haber & Haber, supra note 257, at 339.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 It should be noted that a decision to "pass" on a latent print may reflect one of two
things: (1) a "poor quality" latent, or (2) a latent of acceptable quality that nonetheless may
not easily be attributed to or excluded from the given comparison set. I am grateful to John
R. Vokey for clarifying this point.
295 Haber & Haber, supra note 257, at 339; Andy Newman, Fingerprinting's Reliability
Draws Growing Court Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at A8.
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Indeed, in nearly every context in which misattributions are given a
reasonable opportunity to occur-excluding the artificially easy self-
administered internal FBI proficiency tests29 6-they do occur.
The existing data suggest that the error rate may not be trivial. While a
0.8% false positive rate may sound highly reliable to a layperson, it would
lead to enormous numbers of false convictions. U.S. crime laboratories
processed 238,135 requests for latent print analysis in 2002.297 If these
laboratories committed a false positive on 0.8% of these requests, they
would have reported 1,905 false positives in 2002 alone. Given the
enormous power and credibility of latent print evidence, it must be assumed
that a very high percentage of these 1,905 reports would have resulted in
convictions or guilty pleas. A very large proporition of these may well have
been false.298 And, again, it should be emphasized that there are reasons to
believe that the 0.8% false positive figure may represent only a lower
bound.299
A 0.8% false positive rate would also defy most people's expectations
for fingerprint identification, which is presumed to be very accurate
evidence indeed. Because of the special power of fingerprint evidence and
the presumption of infallibility, latent print examiners testifying falsely
0.8% of the time would probably be viewed as unacceptable by most
criminal justices system actors.
III. THE RHETORIC OF ERROR
A. THE ZERO ERROR RATE
As discussed above, latent print examiners continue to claim that the
error rate of latent print identification is "zero." How can the claim that the
error rate of forensic fingerprint identification is zero be sustained? The
claim is sustained by two types of parsing of errors, which I will call
typological and temporal parsing.
1. Typological Parsing
Typological parsing is achieved by assigning errors to two distinct
categories: "methodological" (sometimes called "scientific") and
296 See supra Part II.B. 1.b.
297 Joseph L. Peterson & Matthew J. Hickman, Census of Publicly Funded Forensic
Crime Laboratories, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., Feb. 2005, at 6.
298 Again, one must assume that in some cases a false positive error would implicate
someone who was, in fact, guilty of the crime. See supra note 274.
299 See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
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"practitioner" (sometimes called "human"). It may be illustrated most
clearly by Agent Meagher's testimony at the Mitchell Daubert hearing:
Q: Now-Your Honor, if I could just have a moment here. Let's move on into error
rate, if we can, please, sir?
I want to address error rate as we have--you've heard testimony about ACE-V, about
the comparative process, all right?
Have you had an opportunity to discuss and read about error rate?
A: Yes.
Q: Are you familiar with that concept when you talk about methodologies?
A: Sure.
Q: And where does that familiarity come from, what kind of experience?
A: Well, when you're dealing with a scientific methodology such as we have for ever
since I've been trained, there are distinctions-there's two parts of errors that can
occur. One is the methodological error, and the other one is a practitioner error.
If the scientific method is followed, adhered to in your process, that the error in the
analysis and comparative process will be zero. It only becomes the subjective opinion
of the examiner involved at the evaluation phase. And that would become the error
rate of the practitioner.
Q: And when you're talking about this, you're referring to friction ridge analysis,
correct?
A: That is correct. It's my understanding of that regardless of friction ridge analysis.
The analysis comparative evaluation and verification process is pretty much the
standard scientific methodology and a lot of other disciplines besides-
Q: And that may be so.
Are you an expert or familiar with other scientific areas of methodologies?
A: No, I'm not an expert, but I do know that some of those do adhere to the same
methodology as we do.
Q: Are you an expert on their error rate?
A: No.
Q: Based on the uniqueness of fingerprints, friction ridge, etcetera, do you have an
opinion as to what the error rate is for the work that you do, latent print examinations?
1035
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A: As applied to the scientific methodology, it's zero.
Meagher's invocation of the "zero methodological error rate"
301generated an approving response within the fingerprint community. In
another case, Meagher testified as follows:
With regards to discussing the error rates in terms of methodology which from my
understanding is the real focus of attention for the hearing here. The methodology has
an error rate of zero where practitioner error rate is whatever practitioner error rates
for that individual or group of individuals.
30 2
Since the Mitchell Daubert hearing, the claim that the error rate of
fingerprint "methodology" is zero has become enshrined as dogma within
the fingerprint community. Latent print examiners are coached to recite this
position when cross-examined. For example, Wertheim fils advises latent
print examiners to answer the question "What is the error rate of fingerprint
identification?" as follows:
In order to fully address this issue, you must decide which error rate you are going to
address. Two types of error are involved: PRACTITIONER error and the error of the
SCIENCE of fingerprints. The fact is, nobody knows exactly how many comparisons
have been done and how many people have made mistakes, so you can't answer that
issue. Of course the error rate for the SCIENCE itself is zero.
The way to answer this question on the stand might sound something like: If by error
you mean HUMAN error, then I would answer that there is no way for me to know,
since I do not have detailed knowledge of casework results from departments
throughout the country. However, if by error you mean the error of the science itself,
then my answer is definitely zero.
If follow up questions are asked, you can explain: There are only three conclusions a
latent print examiner can come to when comparing two prints: Identification,
Elimination, or Insufficient detail to determine. (Explain each of these) Insufficient
doesn't apply, because you are asking about the error rate involving identification.
The fact is, any two prints "of value" either A: were made by the same source, or B:
they were not. There is no probability associated with that fact. Therefore, the
science allows for only one correct answer, and unless the examiner makes a mistake,
it WILL be the correct answer. That is what I mean when I say the error rate for the
science of fingerprints IS zero. (the little emphasis on "is", as you nod your head once
300 Trial Transcript at 154-56, United States v. Mitchell, Cr. No. 96-407 (E.D. Pa. July 8,
1999).
301 David L. Grieve, Simon Says, 51 J. FORENSIc IDENTIFICATION 85, 95-96 (2001) ("Mr.
Meagher correctly stated that a distinction between methodological error and practitioner
error must be noted, and that if the methodology of ACE-V (analysis, comparison,
evaluation and verification) is properly applied during an latent print examination, the error
rate will be zero.").
302 Trial Transcript at 202, People v. McGhee [Robert J. Hood], No. 01CR2120 (D. El
Paso Co., Colo., Jan. 18, 2002).
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to the jury, doesn't show up in the transcript, but it sure helps get the jury to nod back
in agreement! 1)303
It should be noted that, in their sworn testimony, latent print examiners
appear to follow Wertheim's second piece of advice, but not his first. That
is, judging from court opinions (infra Part III.B), latent print examiners do
testify that the "methodological error rate" is zero, but they do not testify
that the "practitioner error rate" is unknown. Rather, they testify that the
practitioner rate is "essentially zero" or "negligible" - statements that have
no basis in any attempt to actually measure the "practitioner error rate" but
are nevertheless taken by courts as gospel.
2. Temporal Parsing
An alternative stratagem rests upon a temporal parsing of error. In
this formulation, all documented errors are consigned to a conceptually
distant past that is no longer relevant to the present. The reasoning is that
errors provoke changes in procedure that then render past procedures
obsolete. Since new procedures are now in place, it is unfair to brand the
state-of-the-art practice with past errors. Temporal parsing may be
illustrated by the testimony of Dr. Budowle at the Mitchell Daubert
hearing:
Q: Tell us how [error rate] applies to scientific methods, methodology.
A: Well, this transcends all kinds of forensic, it transcends all disciplines in that[, but]
in the forensic area particularly, this has been an issue discussed repeatedly in lots of
disciplines, whether it is DNA chemistry and latent fingerprints.
We have to understand that error rate is a difficult thing to calculate. I mean[,] people
are trying to do this, it shouldn't be done, it can't be done. I'll give you an example as
an analogy. When people spell words, they make mistakes. Some make consistent
mistakes like separate, some people I'll say that I do this, I spell it S-E-P-E-R-A-T-E.
That's a mistake. It is not a mistake of consequence, but it is a mistake. It should be
A-R-A-T-E at the end.
That would be an error. But now with the computer and Spell Check, if I set up a
protocol, there is always Spell Check, I can't make that error anymore. You can see,
although I made an error one time in my life, if I have something in place that
demonstrates the error has been corrected, it is no longer a valid thing to add [as] a
cumulative event to calculate what a error rate is. An error rate is a wispy thing like
smoke, it changes over time because the real issue is, did you make a mistake, did you
make a mistake in this case? If you made a mistake in the past, certainly that's valid
information that someone can cross-examine or define or describe whatever that was,
but to say there's an error rate that's definable would be a misrepresentation.




So we have to be careful not to go down the wrong path without understanding what it
is we are trying to quantify.
Now, error rate deals with people, you should have a method that is defined and stays
within its limits, so it doesn't have error at all. So the method is one thing, people
making mistakes is another issue.
304
Whatever the merits, in principle, of Budowle's argument, if taken
seriously, it places an immovable obstacle in the path of any court seeking
to estimate an error rate for anything. There are, of course, inherent
problems in estimating any sort of error rate. But these are problems that
practitioners in diverse areas of science and industry have managed to live
with, and courts, according to the Supreme Court, are now duty-bound to
struggle with them as well. Even if we accept Budowle's argument that it is
difficult to calculate error rates prospectively, that does not mean that we
should not try to estimate error rates, nor that past performance is still
probably the best guide to estimating future performance. In Budowle's
schema, no error rate could ever be calculated, as all exposed errors recede
immediately into the supposedly "irrelevant" past. The error rate does
indeed become "a wispy thing like smoke."
3. What is "Methodological Error Rate"?
The concept of "methodological error rate" is not one that the
government adapted for fingerprinting from some other area of scientific or
technical, endeavor. Typing the term "methodological error rate" into an
Internet search engine (for example, Google) yields results pertaining
almost only to forensic fingerprint evidence, not to any other area of
scientific or technical endeavor. 30 5  In none of its briefs in Mitchell
304 Trial Transcript at 122-23, United States v. Mitchell, Cr. No. 96-407 (E.D. Pa. July 9,
1999). A similar example of the temporal parsing of error may be found in the debate over
wrongful convictions. In a debate over the death penalty, Joshua Marquis dismisses cases of
wrongful conviction that occurred "15 or 20 years ago" as irrelevant to current practice.
Joshua Marquis, Truth and Consequences: The Penalty of Death, in DEBATING THE DEATH
PENALTY 117, 127 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G. Cassell eds., 2004) ("When we debated in
June 2001 in New York City, Steven Bright repeatedly hurled examples from his own state's
past as typical of capital cases. He cited cases involving trials that took place fifteen to
twenty-five years ago to stand for the proposition that the death penalty as it is constituted
today is fundamentally unfair."). This, of course, misses Bright's (and my) point: the trials
that took place fifteen to twenty-five years ago seemed fair at the time (at least to those
whose opinions mattered, like judges). The lesson is not that trials were unfair once and are
fair today, but rather that our methods for detecting fairness prospectively are rather poor.
Our methods for detecting forensic error prospectively are similarly poor.
305 As of Oct. 28, 2003, the term "methodological error rate" entered into Google yielded
exactly one hit, the SWGFAST Guidelines for Proficiency Testing. SWGFAST Guidelines,
at http://www.swgfast.org/Guidelines forProficiencyTesting l_0.pdf ("[p]roficiency
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supporting this concept did the government cite any other area of scientific
or technological endeavor where it is thought appropriate to split the
concept of error rate in this fashion. Nor does the government cite any
other cases in which the Daubert error rate criterion is interpreted in this
fashion. Since the concept exists only in the field of latent print
identification, a field that is not populated by credentialed scientists, it
merits especially strict scrutiny.
The problem is that the practitioner is integral to the method of latent
print identification. In other words, the "methodology" consists entirely
and solely of having a practitioner analyze the prints. There is no
methodology without a practitioner, any more than there is automobile
without a driver, and claiming to have an error rate without the practitioner
is akin to calculating the crash rate of an automobile, provided it is not
driven.
Even if one were to accept the distinction between "methodological"
and "practitioner" error, these categories would be useful only for a
scientific or policy-driven assessment of latent print identification. For
legal purposes, the only relevant matter is the overall error rate-that is, the
sum of the "methodological" and "practitioner" error rates. If one is
boarding an airplane, one is interested in the total error rate-the sum of all
error rates, if error is parsed. Although there may be some utility to parsing
error in the case of airplane crashes into, say, pilot and mechanical errors-
provided, of course, that attributions can be made consistently and
coherently-no one would wish for them to substitute for, or obscure, the
overall error rate. If one is deciding whether to board an airplane, the
relevant information is the overall error rate. If one is deciding whether
scarce resources should be allocated to pilot training or mechanical
inspections, then the relevant information may be to parse crashes into
"human" and "mechanical" causes. A legal fact finder is in the position of
the passenger boarding the plane, not the policymaker allocating resources.
Therefore, judges, who are responsible for ensuring that relevant and
testing is not a measure of methodological error rate") (search on file with the author). The
term "methodological error rate" comes close to being a "Googlewhack," a combination of
two real words that, when combined in a Google search, yield one, and only one, hit.
"Methodological error rate" was not a true Googlewhack because it is three words and uses
quotation marks. See Googlewhack.com, at http://www.googlewhack.com (last visited Mar.
10, 2005).
Performed more recently (July 13, 2004), the exercise yielded five hits, two of which
reference the present author's own published critique of the notion. Simon A. Cole, The
Fingerprint Controversy, 20 IssuEs IN Sci. & TECH. 10 (2004), available at
http://www.issues.org/issues/20.2/forum.html. There are also two hits to actual scientific
publications unrelated to fingerprint identification. My point, however, is still that the rarity
of the term on the Internet is indication that it is far from a widespread scientific concept.
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reliable information is put before the fact finder,306 should be concerned
with the rate at which the process or technique in question provides accurate
conclusions to the fact finder, which is given by the overall error rate. Even
if one were to grant the legitimacy of parsing of error into categories, the
categorical error rates are irrelevant to the court's inquiry. The overall error
rate is the only relevant piece of information to put before a court.
Moreover, unlike the broad categories posited in airplane crashes, the
assignment of error in fingerprint identification is asymmetric. In aviation
risk assessment, neither the pilot nor the mechanical error rate is zero. In
fingerprint identification, one type of error is said to be zero. How can this
be? The answer is that all known cases of error are automatically assigned
to only one of the two categories: practitioner error. By attributing all
documented errors to practitioners, the methodological error rate remains-
eternally-zero. The "methodological error rate," by definition, could not
be anything other than zero. This, of course, takes away the force of any
claim of an empirical finding that the "methodological error rate" has been
found to be zero. Fingerprint evidence could be shoddiest evidence ever
promulgated in a court of law and, defined as it has been, the
"methodological error rate" would still remain zero!
What this means, of course, is that even if in some areas a meaningful
distinction can be drawn between "methodological" and "practitioner"
error, in fingerprint practice the concept is vacuous.
The most generous interpretation of what latent print examiners mean
when they claim the "methodological error rate" is zero is that they are
saying that no latent print misidentifications are caused by nature. In other
words, no misattributions are caused by completely identical areas of
friction ridge detail existing on two different fingers. As one prominent
latent print examiner, William Leo, testified: "And we profess as fingerprint
examiners that the rate of error is zero. And the reason we make that bold
statement is because we know based on 100 years of research that
everybody's fingerprint are unique, and in nature it is never going to repeat
itself again.,
307
As Wertheim pbre puts it, "So when we testify that the error rate is
'zero,' what we mean is that no two people ever have had or ever will have
the same fingerprint. 308 This argument fails to understand that the issue in
the original Mitchell Daubert hearing-and the issue more generally-was
306 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
307 Trial Transcript at 270, People v. Gomez, No. 99CF0391 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Orange Cty.
2002).
308 Pat Wertheim, Don't Panic-BUT..., 30 WEEKLY DETAIL, Mar. 4, 2002, available
at http://www.clpex.com/.
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never about errors caused by individuals possessing duplicate fingerprint
patterns.309
An even more simplistic formulation of this generous version of the
"methodological error rate" is the argument that because there is only one
source for the latent print, the "methodological error rate" is zero. As
Agent Meagher put it in his testimony in a pre-trial hearing in People v.
Hood "Because fingerprints are unique and they are permanent there can
only be one source attributed to an impression that's left so there have-
there can only be one conclusion. It's ident or non ident.
310
One might just as well argue that since there is only one person that an
eyewitness actually saw, one could claim that the "methodological error
rate" of eyewitness identification is zero. Or, that, because each test subject
is either pregnant or not pregnant, the "methodological error rate" of any
pregnancy test-no matter how shoddy31 I-is zero.
It is apparent that, when pressed, latent print examiners can water
down the claim of a "zero methodological error rate" to propositions that
are, in and of themselves, so banal as to be unobjectionable. Who can
doubt that only one individual is, in fact, the source a particular latent print?
Or even that there are not individuals walking around with exact duplicate
ridge detail on their fingertips? The danger lies in not fully communicating
these retreats to the jury. Latent print examiners can clarify what they mean
by "methodological error rate" in their professional literature and in pre-
trial admissibility hearings and neglect to do so in their trial testimony. A
juror who hears "the methodological error rate is zero, and the practitioner
error rate is negligible" would be forgiven for assuming that
"methodological error rate," in this context, refers to something significant,
rather than a banality, like "only one person could have left the latent print."
This potential for using the aura of science to inflate the fact-finder's
309 Memorandum of Law in Support of Mr. Mitchell's Motion to Exclude the
Government's Fingerprint Evidence at 62, United States v. Mitchell, Cr. No. 96-407 (E.D.
Pa. 1999):
The government submits that, in contrast to handwriting evidence, "it is well established that
fingerprints are unique to an individual and permanent." Again, however, the government
simply misses the point. The question is not the uniqueness and permanence of entire fingerprint
patterns, but the scientific reliability of a fingerprint identification that is being made from a
small distorted latent fingerprint fragment.
Id, (internal citations omitted).
310 Trial Transcript at 203, People v. McGhee [Robert J. Hood], No. 01CR2120 (Col.,
D.C. El Paso Cty. Div. 3 Jan. 18, 2002).
311 For a particularly poor pregnancy test, see http://web.archive.org/web/




credence in expert testimony is precisely the sort of thing that an
admissibility standard, like Daubert/Kumho, is designed to mitigate. The
"methodological error rate" is so potentially misleading that courts must
rein it in.
4. The "Roomful of Mathematicians"
The fallacy of the "methodological error rate" is well illustrated by an
example that fingerprint examiners are fond of using: the roomful of
mathematicians. Consider the following analogy drawn by Agent Meagher:
The analogy that I like to use to help better understand the situation is the science of
math. I think everyone agrees that probably the most exact science there is, is
mathematics. 312 And let's take the methodology of addition. If you add 2 plus 2, it
equals 4. So if you take a roomful of mathematics experts and you ask them to
perform a rather complex mathematical problem, and just by chance one of those
experts makes a [sic] addition error - adds 2 plus 2 and gets 5 - does that constitute
that the science of math and the methodology of addition is invalid? No. It simply
says is that that practitioner had an error for that particular day on that problem.
313
Fingerprint examiners are particularly fond of using the mathematics
analogy. Wertheim pre writes, "[j]ust as errors in mathematics result from
mistakes made by mathematicians, errors in fingerprint identification result
from the mistakes of fingerprint examiners. The science is valid even when
the scientist errs. 314  Special Agent German argues, "[t]he latent print
examination community continues to prove the reliability of the science in
spite of the existence of practitioner error. Math is not bad science despite
practitioner error. Moreover, air travel should not be banned despite
occasional crashes due to pilot error. '315 In response to the Mayfield case,
312 Whether mathematics is "a science" is actually a subject of extensive debate. See
generally PHILLIP KITCHER, THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL KNOWLEDGE 3 (1983)
("Virtually every philosopher who has discussed mathematics has claimed that our
knowledge of mathematical truths is different in kind from our knowledge of the
propositions of the natural sciences."). Even to a non-philosopher, however, it should be
clear that fingerprint identification, which deals with actual patterns on biological objects
called skin or measured abilities of analysts to make judgments is quite different from the
manipulation of abstract quantities.
313 Debate on Fingerprint Evidence (WHYY radio broadcast, Apr. 21, 2001), available
at http://www.whyy.org/rameta/RT/RT20010427_20.ram. Meagher offered essentially the
same argument in sworn testimony in Hood. Trial Transcript at 202-04, McGhee [Hood]
(No. 01CR2120).
314 Wertheim, Scientific Comparison, supra note 254, at 5.
315 German, supra note 256. Of course, this does not mean that aviation safety should
not be investigated and improved.
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Wertheim pare commented, "Just because someone fails to balance his
checkbook, that should not shake the foundations of mathematics. 316
The analogy between the practice of forensic fingerprint analysis and
the abstract truth of addition seems rather strained. But, even if we accept
the analogy on its own terms, we can readily apprehend that the only
relevant information for assessing the reliability of a forensic technique is
precisely that which Agent Meagher deems irrelevant: the rate at which the
roomful of mathematicians reaches correct results. In other words, it is the
roomful of mathematicians that constitutes forensic practice, not the
conceptual notion of the addition of abstract quantities. If defendants were
implicated in crimes by mathematicians adding numbers, a court would
want to know the accuracy of the practice of addition, not the abstract truth
of the principles of addition.
B. THE COURTS' VIEW OF ERROR RATE
Courts have been generally credulous of the parsing of error into
categories. In the first written ruling issued in response to an admissibility
to challenge to fingerprint evidence under Daubert, the court wrote:
The government claims the error rate for the method is zero. The claim is
breathtaking, but it is qualified by the reasonable concession that an individual
examiner can of course make an error in a particular case ... Even allowing for the
possibility of individual error, the error rate with latent print identification is
vanishingly small when it is subject to fair adversarial testing and challenge.
3 17
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit credited Agent Meagher's testimony
"that the error rate for fingerprint comparison is essentially zero. Though
conceding that a small margin of error exists because of differences in
individual examiners, he opined that this risk is minimized because print
identifications are typically confirmed through peer review." '318 In United
States v. Crisp, the court similarly accepted at face value the testimony of a
latent print examiner "to a negligible error rate in fingerprint
identifications. 319
In United States v. Sullivan, the court did share "the defendant's
skepticism that" latent print identification "enjoys a 0% error rate.
'320
However, the court concluded that there was no evidence that latent print
identification "as performed by the FBI suffers from any significant error
rate," noting "FBI examiners have demonstrated impressive accuracy on
316 Heath, supra note 289.
317 United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
318 United States v. Haward, 260 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2001).
319 324 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2003).
320 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
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certification-related examinations." 321  These are, of course, the
examinations characterized as laughable by Mr. Bayle and the Lera Plaza
court. 322 The court allowed the government's unsupported claim of a
"minimal error rate" to stand.
3 23
In the first decision in United States v. Llera Plaza (herinafter Llera
Plaza 1), the court allowed the claim of zero "methodological error rate" to
stand, although it dismissed it as largely irrelevant to the reliability
determination before the court.324
In its second decision (hereinafter Llera Plaza fl), however', the court
credited the testimony of FBI examiners that they were not themselves
aware of having committed any errors:
But Mr. Meagher knew of no erroneous identifications attributable to FBI examiners.
Defense counsel contended that such non-knowledge does not constitute proof that
there have been no FBI examiner errors. That is true, but nothing in the record
suggests that the obverse is true. It has been open to defense counsel to present
examples of erroneous identifications attributable to FBI examiners, and no such
examples have been forthcoming. I conclude, therefore, on the basis of the limited
information in the record as expanded, that there is no evidence that the error rate of
certified FBI fingerprint examiners is unacceptably high.
325
The court appears to have understood full well the point made here
(supra Part II.A.4.c) that because of the weakness of exposure mechanisms
it would be foolhardy to assume that known errors are any more than a
small subset of actual errors. Nonetheless, the court chose to use this
argument to uphold fingerprint evidence on the "error rate" prong of Kumho
Tire. As I have argued elsewhere,326 this was poor enough reasoning at the
time, but it is even more embarrassing now that two short years later we do
have definitive proof that the FBI has committed at least one exposed false
positive: the Mayfield case. The court's embarrassment should be even
more acute since the Mayfield case has brought to light that: one of the
examiners implicated in the Mayfield misattribution, John Massey, did, in
321 Id.
322 See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
323 Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 703 ("While the defendant is correct that the party
submitting the evidence has the burden of establishing its reliability under Daubert, the
defendant has failed to submit any evidence to dispute the plaintiffs evidence of a minimal
error rate.").
324 United States v. Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 27305, 14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002), vacated,
188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) [hereinafter Lera Plaza 1] ("Assuming, for the
purposes of the motions now at issue before this court, that fingerprint 'methodology error'
is 'zero,' it is this court's view that the error rate of principal legal consequence is that which
relates to 'practitioner error."').
325 United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 566 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
326 Cole, Grandfathering Evidence, supra note 275, at 1189.
1044 [Vol. 95
2005] ERROR IN LATENT FINGERPRINTIDENTIFICATION
fact, make errors that were exposed within the organization itself prior to
being presented in court; that Massey continued to analyze fingerprints for
the FBI and presumably testify in court with the usual "infallible" aura; and
that Massey was still hired to "verify" an identification in an extremely
high-profile case. Further, Massey's history of false attributions was
exposed during a trial in 1998, four years prior to the Liera Plaza
hearing.
327
The court would have been better educated by asking Agent Meagher
about exposed errors within the laboratory than focusing solely on the
highly unlikely exposure of errors after they are presented in court as
purportedly error-free. In my critique of Lera Plaza II, I argued that
Meagher's testimony was better evidence of the weakness of the FBI's
error-detection mechanisms than it was that the FBI had not committed any
errors.328 Interestingly, in a presentation about the Mayfield case to the IAI,
Meagher reportedly said the following:
Question: "Has the FBI made erroneous identifications before?"
Steve: "The FBI identification unit started in 1933 and we have had 6 or 7 in total
about 1 every 11 years. Some of these were reported and some were not."
329
Given Meagher's sworn testimony in Liera Plaza I, we must assume
that he was referring here to errors that were caught within the laboratory
before being testified to in court. Where and how some of these errors were
"reported" is not clear.
The Third Circuit ruling on the appeal of Mitchell (the first challenge
to fingerprint evidence under Daubert) rejected Mitchell's argument that
there is no methodological error rate distinct from the practitioners. 330 But
the court's reasoning made clear that by "methodological error rate" it
understood something like an "industry-wide" error rate,331 as contrasted
with an individual practitioner error rate, not a theoretical error rate that is
set by fiat at zero. The court acknowledged the argument made in this
article (infra Part III.C) that it is problematic to automatically assign all
known errors to practitioners rather than "the method." But, like other
courts, the Mitchell court then went on to make the unsupported assertion
that "even if every false positive identification signified a problem with the
327 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
328 Cole, Grandfathering Evidence, supra note 275, at 1258-59.
329 Michele Triplett, Steve Meagher's Additions to "Anatomy of Error," Sept. 17, 2004,
at http://www.clpex.com/board/threads/2004-Sep- 1 7/2230/2230.htm.
330 United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 240 n.20 (3d Cir. 2004).
331 Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence:
Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 859, 873-74 (1996).
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identification method itself (i.e., independent of the examiner), the overall
error rate still appears to be microscopic. 332 From this, the court concluded
that "the error rate has not been precisely quantified, but the various
methods of estimating the error rate all suggest that it is very low. ' 3 33 In
short, the court completely neglected the exposure problem indicated by the
fortuity of the known false positives. Instead the court noted that "the
absence of significant numbers of false positives in practice (despite the
enormous incentive to discover them). 334
332 Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 241 n.20.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 241. The Third Circuit's view of error rate is actually even more complex and
even less sustainable than indicated by my summary of the highlights. In addition to the
small number of exposed cases of error, the court cites two other pieces of evidence from the
Mitchell record in support of its assertion that the false positive rate is "very low." First, the
court cites the results of a survey of fifty-one crime laboratories conducted by the
government. Id. at 240. Among the survey items were the two latent prints at issue in
Mitchell itself, which FBI examiners had attributed to Mitchell. One component of the
survey asked laboratories to search Mitchell's latent prints in their fingerprint computer
databases and to have a "court qualified" latent print examiner perform manual comparisons
between the two latents and Mitchell's ten-print card. Some agencies attributed one or both
of the latents to Mitchell. Some agencies, however, reported "no match" to one or both.
The FBI then sent an additional packet to the agencies that declined to attribute one or
both latents to Mitchell. This second packet contained enlarged photographs of the latent
prints and the areas of the ten-print they purportedly "matched." These photographs were
enclosed in plastic sleeves with red dots marking the supposed corresponding ridge
characteristics. A cover letter asked recipients to "[p]lease test your conclusions against
these enlarged photographs with the marked characteristics." All the agencies that
previously failed to corroborate the FBI's attribution now did so.
The Third Circuit treats the above exercise as measuring the error rate of latent print
identification. It notes, correctly, that while a significant number of false negatives occurred,
no false positives occurred in any phase of the exercise. Id. at 239-41.
Treating such an exercise as any sort of measurement of error rate is obviously highly
problematic. The flaws in the proficiency tests described above (supra Part II.B.1) pale in
comparison to those in this exercise. Only one known exemplar (ten-print card) was
provided to compare to the latent prints. This, in itself, cues participants to what the
expected answer is. Moreover, the test-giver then further cued the participants with the
plastic sleeves with red dots. Finally, the test was unproctored. The administrator of the
survey, Agent Meagher, himself denied that the survey should be construed as any sort of
scientific experiment:
Q: And the surveys themselves, did you author them and design them to be a scientific
experiment?
A: No, this was just a survey.
Trial Transcript at 129, Mitchell (No. 96-407) (July 8, 1999).
But it gets worse. The FBI survey can only be construed as evidence that the error rate
of latent print identification is "very low" by assuming the conclusion-that the FBI was
correct that Mitchell was the source of both latent prints. In other words, in ruling on an
evidentiary issue relevant to Mitchell's conviction, the Third Circuit simply assumes
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Mitchell's guilt for the very conviction he is appealing!
It should be further noted that if one assumes that Mitchell is the source of the latent
prints, it is hardly surprising that no false positives were committed during the exercise;
since Mitchell's ten-print card was the only one provided, there would be no way to commit
a false positive (except perhaps by matching one of the latents to one of Mitchell's other
fingers).
The second piece of evidence the Third Circuit used to support its contention that the
error rate of latent print identification is "very low" was a computer exercise the government
put on record at the Mitchell Daubert hearing. 365 F.3d at 225. This exercise, widely
known as the "50K x 50K Study," consisted of computer searching a database of 50,000
print images against itself. Id. The still unpublished "study" upon which the court relies has
now been severely criticized in the academic literature by at least five different authors.
Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to Fingerprint Evidence, 51
J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101, 112 (2001) ("[W]e are amazed it was admitted into
evidence. It is entirely insupportable."); David H. Kaye, Questioning a Courtroom Proof of
the Uniqueness of Fingerprints, 71 INTL STAT. REV. 521, 524 (2003) ("If the government
presented this study.., without qualification, its behavior is disturbing."); Sharath Pankanti
et al., On the Individuality of Fingerprints, 24 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PAMI 1010, 1015
(2002) ("This model grossly underestimates the probability of a false correspondence .... );
David A. Stoney, Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality, in ADVANCES IN FINGERPRINT
TECHNOLOGY 327, 383 (Henry C. Lee & R.E. Gaensslen eds., 2001) ("extraordinarily flawed
and highly misleading"); James L. Wayman, When Bad Science Leads to Good Law: The
Disturbing Irony of the Daubert Hearing in the Case of U.S. v. Byron C. Mitchell,
BIOMETRICS IN THE HUM. SERVICES USER GROUP NEWSL., Feb. 2, 2000, at
http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/biometrics/publicationsdaubert.html ("[T]he government is
comfortable with predicting the fingerprints of the entire history and future of mankind from
a sample of 50,000 images, which could have come from as few as 5,000 people. They have
disguised this absurd guess by claiming reliance on 'statistical estimation'."). The Third
Circuit cites none of this literature, all of which emerged after the government entered the
study into evidence in the Mitchell Daubert hearing. If nothing else, this serves an
illustration of the usefulness of Daubert's emphasis on "peer review and publication."
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
Even setting these criticisms aside, how the court can interpret the "50K Study" as
measuring the false positive error rate is not clear. Even one of the study's authors, Agent
Meagher, denounces as "ill-informed" and "inappropriate" any effort to construe the "50K
Study" as measuring error rate: "First, let me state what the study is not about and that may
assist in clarifying some of the criticism. This is not a study on error rate or an effort to
demonstrate what constitutes an identification." Letter from Stephen Meagher, FBI Agent,
to James Randerson (Jan. 29, 2004) (on file with the author) (in response to James
Randerson and Andy Coghlan); see also James Randerson & Andy Coghlan, Forensic
Evidence Stands Accused, 181 NEW SCIENTIST 6 (2004).
Since the study simply measured the similarity scores generated by a computer and the
prints were never submitted to a human latent print examiner (who always has the final word
on a latent print attribution), it is difficult to see how the study could be construed as
measuring false positives. Even if one were interested in the computer's tendency to commit
a "false positive" (i.e., reporting a higher similarity score for prints of different origin than
for prints from the same finger), the study was very poorly deigned to measure this because
it compared each print image to itself(rather than comparing to different impression from the
same source finger). (This, among other things, is the reason for the academics' criticisms
cited above.) On the several occasions where two different prints from the same finger were
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Of course, a technique with a "very low" measured error rate may be
admissible, but it ought not be permitted to tell the fact-finder that its error
rate is "zero." Interestingly, the court acknowledges this, noting, "the
existence of any error rate at all seems strongly disputed by some latent
fingerprint examiners." '335 The court looks dimly on this. In one of its
"three important applications" of "[t]he principle that cross-examination
and counter-experts play a central role in the Rule 702 regime, '' 316 the court
notes that
district courts will generally act within their discretion in excluding testimony of
recalcitrant expert witnesses-those who will not discuss on cross-examination things
like error rates or the relative subjectivity or objectivity of their methods. Testimony
at the Daubert hearing indicated that some latent fingerprint examiners insist that
there is no error rate associated with their activities.... This would be out-of-place
under Rule 702. But we do not detect this sort of stonewalling on the record before
337
Us.
Here, then, is a welcome and long overdue judicial repudiation of
latent print examiners' claim of a "zero methodological error rate." The
only baffling part is the court's patently false assertion that such claims
were not made "on the record before us," when, as we have seen338 the
claim originated and was most fully developed in the very record before the
court. There is no record in which the claim of a zero error rate was made
earlier, nor any record in which it was made more forcefully.
In sum, not only do courts gullibly accept the claim of the zero
"methodological error rate," they also parrot totally unsupported assertions
from latent print examiners that the so-called "practitioner error rate" is
"vanishingly small," "essentially zero," "negligible," "minimal," or
,'microscopic." These assertions are based on no attempt to responsibly
estimate the "practitioner error rate"; they are based solely on latent print
examiners' confidence in their own practice. Confidence, as we know from
the world of eyewitness identification, does not necessarily equate with
accuracy. 339 A sign of hope, however, recently emerged from a concurring
opinion in the Court of Appeals of Utah, which suggested that "we should
(accidentally) in the database, the computer did commit "false positives" on several
occasions. That is, similarity scores for prints originating from different fingers were within
the range of similarity scores for prints originating from the same finger. Robert Epstein,
Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" is Revealed, 75 So. CAL. L.
REv. 605, 631 (2002); Stoney, supra, at 380-83.
335 Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 239.
336 Id. at 245.
337 Id. at 245-46.
338 See supra notes 299, 303 and accompanying text.
339 See generally ELIZABETH F. LoFrus, EYEwITNEss TEsTimONY (2d ed. 1996).
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instruct our juries that although there may be scientific basis to believe that
fingerprints are unique, there is no similar basis to believe that examiners
are infallible.
341
"Methodological error rate" might be viewed not merely as a product
of latent print examiners' and prosecutors' misunderstanding of the notion
of error rate, but, worse, as a deliberate attempt to mislead finders of fact.
The concern over the potential for a finder of fact to give inflated credence
to evidence clad in the mantle of science is embedded in the very notion of
having an admissibility barrier.341 The potential to mislead a fact-finder by
saying, "My methodological error rate is zero, and my practitioner error rate
is negligible," is extremely high. The "methodological error rate" is a
bankrupt notion that should have been immediately rejected when it was
first proposed. Indeed, it probably would have been, had it not been
advanced in defense of something with such high presumed accuracy as
latent print identification. Since it was not rejected, courts should do as the
Third Circuit said (if not as it did) and exclude any testimony claiming that
the error rate of latent print identification (or, for that matter, anything) is
zero because of the extreme danger that fact-finders will give it credence. If
they do not, then all sorts of expert and non-expert witnesses will be able to
invoke this notion as well. Why should the manufacturer of litmus paper
not be able to claim that her litmus paper has a zero "methodological error
rate" because substances are either acid, base, or neutral? Why not allow
the eyewitness to claim a zero "methodological error rate" because only one
person was seen? Why not allow a medium to claim a zero
"methodological error rate" because the defendant is either guilty or
innocent? Why not allow all pregnancy tests to claim a zero
"methodological error rate" because all women either are pregnant or are
not? The scientific and forensic scientific communities should also
explicitly disavow the notion of "methodological error rate" as it is framed
by latent print examiners.
C. ACCOUNTING FOR ERROR
In one sense, the claim of a zero "methodological error rate" is merely
a rhetorical ploy to preserve fingerprinting's claim to infallibility. But, at
the same time, it has a more insidious effect. The insistence upon
"methodological" infallibility serves to deter inquiry into how the process
of fingerprint analysis can produce errors. This, in turn, hampers efforts to
improve the process of fingerprint analysis and, possibly, reduce the rate of
340 State v. Quintana, 103 P.3d 168, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (Thome, J., concurring).
341 See Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 23.
1049
SIMON A. COLE
error. Only by confronting and studying errors can we learn more about
how to prevent them.342
The mechanism for assigning all errors to the category of "human
error" is attributing them to "incompetence." Elsewhere I have explored the
sociological dimensions of the fingerprint profession's mechanisms for
sacrificing practitioners who have committed exposed false positives on the
altar of incompetence, in order to preserve the credibility of the technique
itself.343 In fingerprint identification, incompetence is said to be the cause
of all known cases of error-at least all of those that are not assigned to
outright fraud or malfeasance. These attributions of incompetence, as we
shall see, are made in a retrospective fashion and without evidence. In
short, the only evidence adduced in favor of the claim that the examiner was
incompetent is the same thing incompetence is supposed to explain: the
exposed misattribution. Incompetence then supports a variant on the "zero
methodological error rate" argument: the claim that "the technique" is
infallible as long as "the methodology" is applied correctly. Again,
attributions of incorrect application of the methodology are made in a
retrospective fashion without evidence. It is the exposed error that tells us
that correct procedures were not followed.
Fingerprint examiners steadfastly maintain that the process is error-
free in competent hands. Ashbaugh states, "When an examiner is properly
trained a false identification is virtually impossible."344  Wertheim pere
asserts, "Erroneous identifications among cautious, competent examiners,
thankfully, are exceedingly rare; some might say 'impossible.' ' 345
Wertheimfils flatly declares, "a competent examiner correctly following the
ACE-V methodology won't make errors."346  And, elsewhere: "When
coupled with a competent examiner following the Analysis, Comparison,
Evaluation process and having their work verified, fingerprint identification
is a science, the error rate of the science is zero."347 Beeton states, "As long
342 This argument is, in some sense, isomorphic with an argument about "errors of
justice" in general, and the U.S. legal system's notorious, and oft-remarked, reluctance to
examine and investigate cases of error, such as miscarriages of justice. See SCI-ECK ET AL.,
supra note 68.
343 See Cole, Witnessing Identification, supra note 64.
344 David R. Ashbaugh, The Premise of Friction Ridge Identification, Clarity, and the
Identification Process, 44 J. FoRENsIc IDENTIFICATION 499, 514 (1994).
345 Wertheim, Scientific Comparison, supra note 254, at 6. Wertheim goes on to say,
"Clerical errors, however, are not uncommon."
346 Kasey Wertheim, 54 WEEKLY DETAIL, Aug. 19, 2002, available at
http://www.clpex.com/Articles/TheDetaill -99/TheDetail54.htm.
347 Kasey Wertheim, 2 WEEKLY DETAIL, Aug. 13, 2001, available at
http://www.clpex.com/Articles/TheDetail/TheDetail2.htm; see also Jofre, supra note 187
("The system of fingerprint identification is infallible. The expert individually is not.").
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as properly trained and competent friction ridge identification specialists
apply the scientific methodology, the errors will be minimal, if any.,
348
These arguments can be sustained, even in the face of exposed cases of
misidentification committed by IAI-certified, or otherwise highly qualified,
examiners only by retrospectively deeming individuals who have
committed exposed false positives incompetent.
Thus, Sedlacek, Cook, and Welbaum, the three examiners implicated
in the Caldwell case, were deemed incompetent, despite being IAI-
certified.349 In the Cowans case, Massachusetts Attorney General Thomas
Reilly, after failing to secure a criminal indictment for perjury against
LeBlanc, stated, "Science is not an issue in this case. What we know is that
there is right way to do this and the right way was not followed."35
LeBlanc himself, said, curiously, "The system failed me. And the system
failed Cowans. ' 351
Regarding the Jackson case, Agent Meagher stated
348 Mary Beeton, The Fingerprint Controversy, 20 IssuEs iN Sci. & TECH. 9, 10 (2004)
(Editorial).
349 A word should perhaps be added here about decertification. Other than criminal
charges, which as far as can be determined have never been successful for misattributions
that were not clearly intentional, decertification is the only official sanction available as a
response to a misattribution. In recent years, it has appeared that decertification is automatic
for any misattribution. Cole, Witnessing Identification, supra note 65, at 701. (This policy
may be severely tested in the Mayfield case because Mr. Moses is such a prominent figure in
the field.) However, decertification is a sanction available only to IAI-certified examiners.
For example, in the Jackson case Creighton was decertified, but it is not clear what, if any,
sanctions were leveled against Paparo and White. Scheier, supra note 178. Oddly, only the
more highly qualified examiners are more vulnerable to sanction.
As I have noted elsewhere, the sanction of decertification for a single error is an
extremely harsh sanction that is unusual among professional groups. Cole, Witnessing
Identification, supra note 65, at 701. My argument might be interpreted as being critical of
this policy, but, in fact, it is not. Given the current state of affairs in which latent print
identification is essentially unregulated, untested, and offers highly inflated confidence
levels in sworn testimony-the threat of decertification is essentially the only quality control
measure in place. My argument, however, is that the selective threat of decertification is
inferior to, say, validation studies or measuring the error rate as a method of properly
presenting the accuracy of the technique to the finder of fact.
The threat of decertification is supposed to force certified latent print examiners to
treat every identification as potentially career-ending if it turns out to be erroneous. Id. at
702. This may well be an effective mechanism for raising the accuracy of fingerprint
identification. The data presented here, however, demonstrate that it is certainly not entirely
effective. And, the mere existence of the sanction certainly does not give us warrant to
neglect measuring its effectiveness.
350 Franci Richardson, O'Toole Eyes Penalty vs. Print Technican, BOSTON HERALD, June
25, 2004, at 10.
351 McRoberts & Mills, supra note 210.
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I think this was a-a case where you need to really look at the qualifications of the
examiners. Having looked at the prints, I would certainly say that these individuals
were lacking the necessary training and experience needed to take on that level of a
comparison examination that they did.
3 5 2
Again, one of the three examiners implicated in the disputed
attribution (Creighton) was IAI-certified, and, therefore, should be difficult
to deem incompetent. On paper, the IAI-certified expert Creighton, who
was "wrong," was no less qualified than the IAI-certified experts Wynn and
McCloud, who were "right." It is only because we now agree with Wynn
and McCloud that we deem Creighton incompetent. Notice the circularity
of Meagher's argument: "Having looked at the prints, I would certainly say
that these individuals were lacking.. .." 353 It is by looking at the evidence,
that we are able to judge the expert's competence. Yet, in all routine
fingerprint cases it is only by looking at the competence of the expert that
we are able to judge the evidence!
This approach to error raises the problem of the unreliability of
mechanisms to expose incompetence. Imagine, for instance, that Jackson
had fewer resources to marshal in his defense and had either been unable to
procure defense experts or had procured less able defense experts who had
corroborated the misidentification. The examiners who made the
misidentification would now be presumed competent. Indeed, according to
the logic put forward by proponents of fingerprint identification, the jury
would be justified in believing-or being told-that forensic fingerprint
identification, when in the hands of "competent" experts such as these, is
error-free. Alternatively, consider the case of the identifications made by
these experts just before they took on the Jackson case. Should the experts
be deemed competent in these judgments or incompetent?
Finally, it should be noted that all of these attributions of
incompetence are simply postulated. No evidence was advanced to show
that Sedlacek, Cook, Welbaum, or Creighton were incompetent. Instead,
the presumed misattributions serve as the sole evidence of incompetence.
1. Incompetence as a Hypothesis
At root, incompetence as an explanation for error is a hypothesis.
Proponents of forensic identification attribute all exposed errors to
incompetence. This may or may not be correct, but the answer cannot be
known simply by assuming the conclusion.
352 60 Minutes: Fingerprints, supra note 28.
353 Id.
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Consider once again the analogy with airplane crashes, an area where
the adjudication of the attribution of an accident to a category of error (pilot
or mechanical) is often hotly contested and highly consequential. In this
case, there are actors with an interest in both attributions of error (the
manufacturer and its insurer favor pilot error; the pilots' union-and
perhaps the victims, seeing the manufacturer as having the deeper
pockets-favor mechanical error). Clearly, reasons must be given to
attribute the error to one cause or the other. Although the attribution may
be contested, both sides must adduce evidence in favor of their
hypothesized cause of error.
In the cases discussed above, the attribution of incompetence is
circular. No evidence is offered that the examiner is incompetent other than
the fact that he or she participated in an error. The fingerprint establishment
"knows" that the examiner is incompetent only because it disagrees with
that examiner's conclusion in a particular case. Thus, the fingerprint
establishment's judgment of the examiner's competence is based, not on
any objective measure of competence, but solely on whether it agrees with
the examiner's conclusions in one case.
The effect of this is the creation of what might be called "a self-
contained, self-validating system." Observe:
1. The proposition is urged that: Forensic fingerprint identification is
100% accurate (error-free) when performed by a competent
examiner.
2. This proposition can only be falsified (refuted) by the demonstration
of a case in which a "competent" examiner makes an error.
3. When cases of error are exposed, the examiners implicated are
immediately, automatically, and retrospectively deemed
"incompetent."
4. No exposed error-and no number of exposed errors-can refute the
proposition.
5. The proposition cannot be refuted.
Note also another effect of this: all criminal defendants are forced into the
position of assuming that examiners in their cases are competent. Since
incompetence is only exposed in a retrospective fashion (i.e. by making a
misidentification) and such examiners are almost always excommunicated
from the profession, all criminal defendants are subject to the "infallible"
competent examiner.354
354 Among the cases discussed, only perhaps in the case of the anonymous, still-
practicing examiner implicated in the Midwestern Case, could a defendant in a new case
faced with this expert's testimony expose the expert's history of error. But since the
1053
SIMON A. COLE
The remarkable thing is that we can easily imagine a state of affairs in
which the proposition urged in (1) above can be tested. All we need is
some measure of competence that is not circular, that does not depend on
exposed misidentifications. For instance, one might reasonably treat the
IAI's certification examination as a measure of competence. In that case,
we would reason as follows:
1. The proposition is urged that: Forensic fingerprint identification is
100% accurate (error-free) when performed by a competent
examiner.
2. Passage of the IAI certification test is a measure of competence.
3. The proposition may now be falsified by the exposure of a case in
which an IAI-certified examiner is implicated in a
misidentification. (Of course, in true falsificationist fashion, even
if no such case is exposed, we still do not know that the
proposition is true.)
4. IAI-certified examiners have been implicated in misidentifications
(supra Part II.A.4.d).
5. The proposition is false.
Note that this way of reasoning about error does not, contrary to what some
might suggest, cause the sky to fall upon forensic fingerprint identification.
All we have arrived at is that rather reasonable position that forensic
fingerprint identification is not error-free. Fingerprint examiners admit this.
But they attempt to have their cake and eat it too, by insisting on some
mythical error-free zone that is unsullied by exposed cases of error.
The real danger of attributing error to incompetence is that it works
just as well, regardless of the actual accuracy of the technique. In fact, the
tragic irony of forensic fingerprint identification is that, even though it may
be highly accurate, it adopts modes of reasoning and argumentation so
obscurantist that they would work as well even if it were highly
inaccurate.355
examiner remains anonymous, this would require the defendant's attorney to embark on a
"fishing expedition."
355 Simon A. Cole, Fingerprinting: The First Junk Science?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
73 (2003). For example, consider the following:
1. The proposition is urged that The Ordeal (sealing accused witches in gunny sacks
weighted with rocks and hurling them into a body of water, with sinking indicating
guilt as a witch) is 100% accurate and error-free when performed by a competent
"ordealist."
2. A case of error is exposed. (The purported victim of witchcraft turns up alive and
well.)
3. The implicated ordealists are deemed incompetent.
4. The proposition has not been falsified.
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2. Alternate Theoretical Approaches
As a hypothesis, the assignment of all exposed errors to incompetence
is unpersuasive. The range of circumstances, even in the very small data set
of exposed cases, is extremely broad. Errors have been committed in
obscure local law enforcement agencies by unheralded practitioners
(Trogden) 356 and by the elite of the profession in the highest profile cases
imaginable (Mayfield).357 These examples suggest that error does not
necessarily require an explanation; it is part of normal practice and is hardly
surprising. All areas of scientific and technical practice are infused with
error and have to confront and try to understand their own sources of error.
Indeed, in some areas of science, like astronomy, as Professor Alder has
recently eloquently described, the understanding of error is, in some ways,
the core of the scientific work.358
Thus, one consequence of insisting upon incompetence as the
explanation for all errors is that it prevents us from understanding anything
about fingerprint errors. In place of the fingerprint community's unhelpful
and unsupportable insistence upon assigning all errors to incompetence, I
will suggest two sociological frameworks for thinking in a realistic way
about forensic errors.
a. The Sociology of Error
One way of understanding the fingerprint community's insistence on
the incompetence hypothesis draws from a sociology of science notion
called "the sociology of error., 359  This refers to the tendency, in
commenting on science, to invoke "external causes," such as sociological or
psychological phenomena, asymmetrically, to explain only incorrect results,
not correct ones. Correct results are attributed solely to "nature," whereas
false results are attributed to bias, ambition, financial pressure, and other
such causes. For example, it has become commonplace to attribute Martin
Fleischmann and Stanley Pons's premature announcement of having
achieved cold fusion to "psychological" and "sociological" explanations-
greed, ego, ambition, and the excessive pressure to publish first that
5. The proposition can never be falsified.
See also Jane Campbell Moriarty, Wonders of the Invisible World.- Prosecutorial Syndrome
and Profile Evidence in the Salem Witchcraft Trials, 26 VT. L. REV. 43 (2001).
356 Starrs, supra note 102.
357 Stacey, supra note 47.
358 KEN ALDER, THE MEASURE OF ALL THINGS: THE SEVEN-YEAR ODYSSEY AND HIDDEN
ERROR THAT TRANSFORMED THE WORLD 307 (2002).
359 DAVID BLOOR, KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL IMAGERY 12 (2d ed. 1991).
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pervades contemporary science.360  However, such explanations cannot
explain incorrect results unless it is implausibly assumed that these
psychological and sociological forces are not operative when science yields
purportedly "correct" results. As Bloor puts it:
This approach may be summed up by the claim that nothing makes people do things
that are correct but something does make, or cause them to go wrong.
The general structure of these explanations stands out clearly. They all divide
behaviour or belief into two types, right or wrong, true or false, rational or irrational.
They then invoke sociological or psychological causes to explain the negative side of
the division. Such causes explain error, limitation and deviation. The positive side of
the evaluative divide is quite different. Here logic, rationality and truth appear to be
their own explanation. Here psycho-social causes do not need to be invoked .... The
central point is that, once chosen, the rational aspects of science are held to be self-
moving and self-explanatory. Empirical or sociological explanations are confined to
the irrational .... Causes can only be located for error. Thus the sociology of
knowledge is confined to the sociology of error.
3 6 1
We can see the operation of this logic in latent print examiners' self-
analysis. Incompetence, prosecutorial pressure, over-haste, a "bad day,"
vigilantism, and so on are invoked to explain errors. But presumably, if
these factors were in force when errors were produced, they were also in
force when supposedly "correct" results were produced as well.
As an antidote to the sociology of error, Bloor proposed the principles
of "impartiality" and "symmetry." Bloor proposed that sociological
explanations of the production of scientific knowledge would have to be
capable of explaining the production of both "false" and "correct" beliefs
(impartiality). And, the same causes would have to explain both "false"
and "correct" beliefs (symmetry).362
We might begin to apply an impartial, symmetric analysis to
fingerprint misattributions. The fingerprint community's inquiries into its
own errors tend to fall, exactly into the sociology of error. Once it is
determined that the conclusion was in error, retrospective explanations are
sought as causes of the erroneous conclusions. But there is absolutely no
evidence that fingerprint misattributions are caused by "the process" gone
awry. (Indeed, because latent print examiners do not record bench notes-
document what leads to their conclusions-there would be no way of
demonstrating this even if it were true.) It is more likely that whatever
360 HARRY COLLINs & TREVOR PINCH, THE GOLEM: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT SCIENCE 57 (1993).
361 BLOOR, supra note 359, at 8-12 (citations omitted).
362 Id. at 7.
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process it is that produces correct results also sometimes produces incorrect
results.
If it were true that fingerprint errors had different superficial attributes
from correct conclusions, detecting errors would not be difficult. We could
simply devise ways of detecting incompetent examiners, bad days, high-
pressure laboratories, and so on. But the insidious thing about fingerprint
attributions is that they look just like correct attributions, until we identify
them as misattributions.
In short, retrospective explanations of fingerprint misattributions will
not help us learn to identify them prospectively. This is the intended
meaning of my epigraph-not, as the reader may have initially assumed, to
liken latent print examiners to charlatans. The epigraph highlights, with
absurd precision, the obvious point that the insurance scam only works
because the mark cannot prospectively tell the difference between an honest
insurance salesman and an imposter. The same is true of a fingerprint
identification. The criminal justice system has no way of prospectively
distinguishing between correct latent print attributions and misattributions.
But, more importantly, it is true of the latent print examiner as well. A
falsely matching known print (an imposter) presumably looks much the
same as a truly matching one. What this leaves us with is an empirical
question about latent print examiners' ability to detect imposters.3 63 All the
rest of it-good intentions, the fact that there is only one finger that left the
print-is beside the point. Latent print examiners are not the phony
insurance salesmen of my epigraph; they are the victims, the unwitting
consumers.
For instance, in the wake of the Mayfield case, some latent print
examiners have declared that they "do not agree with the identification."
364
But whether a latent print examiner agrees with an identification that is
posted on the Internet as a misattribution is of little interest to us. As my
epigraph suggests, we want to know whether latent print examiners can
distinguish the fake insurance salesmen from the real ones before they
know they're phony, not after.
b. Normal Accidents Theory
Another way of looking at this problem is drawn from "normal
accidents theory" (NAT).365  Professor Perrow suggests that many
363 My use of the term "imposter," and its connection with my epigraph, is deliberate.
"Imposter" is a technical term used by psychologists who study matching tasks (of which
latent print identification is one) for an item that should not be matched.
364 Wertheim, supra note 30.
365 CHARLES PERROW, NoRmAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES
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catastrophic failures of technical systems are caused, not by deviation from
proper procedure, but from the normal functioning of highly complex and
"tightly coupled"366  systems (hence the term "normal accidents").
Fingerprint analysis is not highly complex, but it is tightly coupled.367
Similarly, Professor Vaughan suggests that error and misjudgment can be
part of normal behavior, not necessarily caused by deviance.368 NAT would
suggest that fingerprint errors are not pathological deviations from normal
procedure, but simply consequences of normal activity.
Perrow's analysis of marine accidents is suggestive of the type of
"normal accident" that a latent print misattribution might be. These are
accidents that are to some extent caused by creating an erroneous image of
the world and interpreting all new, potentially disconfirming, information in
light of that "expected world." As Perrow puts it:
[W]e construct an expected world because we can't handle the complexity of the
present one, and then process the information that fits the expected world, and find
reasons to exclude the information that might contradict it. Unexpected or unlikely
interactions are ignored when we make our construction.
3 69
Now consider Wertheim p&e's description of latent print
identification:
[T]he examiner would proceed with experimentation (finding features in the latent
print, then examining the inked print for the same features) until the instant that the
thought first crystallizes that this is, in fact, an identification .... The examiner
continues to search for new features until it is reliably proven that each time a new
feature is found in the latent print, a corresponding feature will exist in the latent
print.370
While Wertheim thinks he has described "science," he has in fact
described a process of gradually biasing his analysis of new information
based on previously analyzed information. Could this be what happens in a
fingerprint misattribution? Could it be that an examiner, having formed a
hypothesis that two prints come from a common source, interprets
potentially disconfirming information in a manner consistent with this
(1984).
366 Systems designed to act as checks on one another are, in fact, highly dependent on
one another.
367 For example, "verification," the process by which an examiner checks a colleague's
work, is often performed under conditions in which the examiner knows-and therefore may
be influenced by-the original examiner's conclusion. Hence the high rate at which disputed
attributions were confirmed by the verifier.
368 DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DEcISION (1996).
369 PERROW, supra note 365, at 214.
370 Wertheim, Scientific Comparison, supra note 254, at 7.
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hypothesis? Could this explain why latent print examiners make
misattributions that in retrospect seem clearly erroneous?
3. Alternate Causes of Error
I have argued that we need to confront and understand the nature of
fingerprint error, rather than minimizing it, dismissing it, or retrospectively
blaming it on incompetence. I will now suggest two possible causal
mechanisms for fingerprint errors. While I cannot demonstrate a causal
relationship between these factors and fingerprint errors, or arbitrate
between these two mechanisms, I would suggest that they are at least as
likely to be causal mechanisms as incompetence.
a. Natural Confounding
The first alternate hypothesis is that disputed attributions are caused by
the existence of areas of friction ridge skin on different persons' fingertips
that, while not identical, are in fact quite similar. This possibility has been
totally dismissed by the fingerprint community in its insistence upon the
absolute uniqueness of all areas of friction ridge skin, no matter how small.
This fact is supposed to rest upon a "law" that nature will never repeat the
same pattern exactly. Even accepting, for the moment, this flawed
argument, it does not hold that nature might not produce confounding
patterns. In other words, nature might produce areas of friction ridge skin
that, though not identical, are quite similar, similar enough to be
confounded when using the current tools of analysis (i.e., "ACE-V").
In some sense this would be analogous to what, in forensic DNA
typing, is called an "adventitious" or "coincidental" match. This refers to
the fact that, given a certain DNA profile, a certain number of individuals
may be expected to match the profile, even though they did not, in fact,
leave the crime-scene sample. This expectation is phrased as the "random
match probability. 3 71  There is an important difference between an
adventitious match in DNA and the analogous phenomenon in
fingerprinting. In a DNA adventitious match, the samples do in fact match.
In other words, there is no way of knowing that the match is "adventitious"
rather than "true," other than, perhaps, external factors that make the
hypothesis that the identified individual is the true source of the match
implausible (such as, that the individual was incarcerated at the time).
Because a fingerprint match is a subjective determination, there is a
sense in which an adventitious fingerprint match does not "really" match.
371 David H. Kaye & George F. Sensabaugh, Jr., DNA Typing: Scientific Status, in
SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE IssUES 697, 726 (Faigman et al. eds., 2002).
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That is, once the match has been deemed erroneous one can find differences
between the two prints. There are always differences between print pairs.
In an identification, however, these differences are deemed explainable by
the examiner.
b. Bias
A second alternative hypothesis is bias. Bias can come in many forms.
The tendency of forensic scientists to suffer from "pro-prosecution bias,"
which may be more or less conscious, as a consequence either of being law
enforcement agents, identifying closely with them, or of simply working
closely with them, has been well noted.372 This certainly might be
problematic in fingerprint identification where a high proportion of
practitioners are law enforcement officers and virtually all practitioners
acquired their expertise through work in law enforcement.
However, by "bias" I also mean to refer to a politically neutral form of
psychological bias that has nothing to do with the analyst's conscious or
unconscious feelings about the parties in criminal cases. In a
groundbreaking article on "observer effects" in forensic science, Professors
Risinger, Saks, Thompson, and Rosenthal draw on psychological literature
to support the argument that forensic technicians engaged in tasks of
determining whether two objects derive from a common source, like latent
print identification, are subject to "expectation bias. 373 In other words, the
very process of what, in the so-called "ACE-V methodology," is called
"Comparison"-going from the unknown to the known print-to see if the
ridge detail is "in agreement" may create an expectation bias. Features seen
in the unknown print may be more likely to be "seen" in the known print or,
even more insidiously, vice versa. These effects will tend to cause
observers to expect to see similarities, instead of differences, and may
contribute to erroneous source attributions. Risinger et al. note that
observer effects are well known in areas of science that are highly
dependent on human observation, like astronomy, and these disciplines
have devised mechanisms for mitigating, correcting, and accounting for
them. Forensic science, however, has remained stubbornly resistant to even
recognizing that observer effects may be in force.374
372 See generally Paul Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases:
The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 439 (1997).
373 D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in
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Latent print identification-in which no measurements are taken, but a
determination is simply made by an examiner as to whether she believes
two objects derive from a common source-is a prime candidate for the
operation of observer effects. Several factors support the plausibility of the
observer effects hypothesis. First, many of the disputed identifications
discussed above were confirmed by second, third, and even fourth
examiners.375 Since there is no policy in place for blinding verifiers from
the conclusion reached by the original examiner, these examiners almost
surely knew that their colleagues had reached conclusions of identification.
This suggests that examiners are indeed subject to expectation and
suggestibility and that these forces can cause them to corroborate
misattributions. If expectation bias causes latent print examiners to
corroborate misattributions, could it cause them to generate them as well?
Even more suggestive are the cases in which examiners employed by
the defense corroborated disputed attributions. That defense examiners
sometimes corroborate disputed attributions would suggest that expectation
and suggestion are so powerful they can overcome the defense expert's
presumed pro-defendant bias. If anything, we would expect defense
examiners to be biased in favor of exclusion because they are working for
clients with an interest in being excluded.37 6 The work of a defense
examiner likely consists mainly of confirming that the state's examiners did
in fact reach the right conclusion. This may create a situation in which the
defense examiner expects virtually all print pairs put before her to match.
The fact that defense examiners have corroborated disputed identifications
indicates that expectation bias may be even more powerful than the expert's
bias toward the party retaining her.
4. The Mayfield Case
It will be useful to explore the possible roles of natural confounding
and observer effects by returning to what is perhaps the richest and most
theoretically interesting (as well as the most recent and sensational)
misattribution case: the false arrest of Brandon Mayfield. In the wake of
the uproar, the FBI promised a review by "an international panel of
375 See supra Part II.A. 1.
376 It should be noted that defense experts are typically paid the same amount no matter
what their findings. On the other hand, a defense expert who disagrees with the government
expert's conclusion is likely to bill more hours because the dispute will probably engender
more protracted litigation over the fingerprint evidence. In the main, however, the defense
expert's bias is probably less pecuniary than it is the natural tendency of all experts to
become polarized by the adversarial process and become more sympathetic toward the party
retaining them. Maggie Bruck, The Trials and Tribulations of a Novice Expert Witness, in
EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES 85 (Ceci & Hembrooke eds., 1998).
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fingerprint experts., 3 77  That review is now complete, and the FBI has
published a "synopsis" of the International Review Committee's findings.378
The report adopts the rhetorical distinction between "human" and
"methodological" error, claiming, "The error was a human error and not a
methodology or technology failure., 379 The claim that the Mayfield error
somehow did not involve "the methodology" as properly practiced is
particularly difficult to sustain given the impeccable credentials of the
laboratory, the individual examiners, and the independent expert.
The most easily dismissed hypothesis was that the error was caused by
the digital format in which the Madrid print was transmitted to the FBI.
380
A second hypothesis posed by an anonymous FBI official in the press was
"that the real issue was the quality of the latent print that the Spaniards
originally took from the blue bag."381 But, this explanation can also be
dismissed because the Spanish were apparently able to effect an
identification to Daoud from the latent print, so the latent print was
presumably of adequate quality.
As mentioned above,382 the report singles out the high-profile nature of
the case as an explanation for the error. This conclusion is interesting-and
quite damaging to latent print identification's claims to objectivity. If latent
print identification is less reliable in high profile cases, then how objective
can the analysis be? But, pending further evidence, the conclusion is
unpersuasive. The report offers no evidence, such as statements by the
examiners, as to how the high-profile nature of the case might have
influenced them. Instead, because an error occurred in a high-profile case,
the report simply assumes that a causal relationship exists.
There is no reason for us to accept this hypothesis as more persuasive
than the NAT hypothesis: that the error was a product of normal operating
procedure and that, if anything, the high-profile nature of the case is an
explanation for the error's exposure, not its occurrence.
377 FBI Press Release, supra note 4.
378 Stacey, supra note 47, at 708. The International Review Committee's original report
has not been released or published. What we have instead is the FBI's "synopsis" of an
external committee's report about an FBI error. Suffice it to say that this is an unusual way
of conducting an external review.
379 Id. at 712.
380 Id. at 714 ("All of the committee members agree that the quality of the images that
were used to make the erroneous identification was not a factor."). It is certainly true,
however, that digital images may exacerbate the possibility of misattribution. Michael
Cherry et al., Does the Use of Digital Techniques by Law Enforcement Authorities Create a
Risk of Miscarriage of Justice?, CHAMPION, Nov. 2004, at 24.
381 Kershaw, supra note 223, at A13.
382 See supra note 47 and text accompanying supra note 234.
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At bottom, blaming the error on the nature of the case is merely a
continuation of the rhetorical strategy of seeking to dismiss all errors as
exceptional cases. The latent print community's characterization of the
error as "the perfect storm '383 illustrates the effort to portray the case as so
exceptional that it remains irrelevant to all other cases.
Ultimately, the report itself identifies the reason that we are unlikely
ever to find a persuasive explanation for the error. Because latent print
examiners do not keep bench notes (they do ,not document their
findings), 384it is nearly impossible to retrospectively reconstruct a
misattribution.
Given the impossibility of reconstructing the examiner's subjective
process, let us explore the possibilities of natural confounding and bias.
Could the Mayfield error be due to natural confounding? The FBI press
release refers to "the remarkable number of points of similarity between Mr.
Mayfield's prints and the print details in the images submitted to the
FBI. 385 The possibility that the Mayfield case represents the first exposed
"adventitious cold hit ' 386 in a latent print database is intriguing.
. As I have noted elsewhere, the idea of searching latent prints in some
sort of seamless global database has been an unfulfilled dream throughout
the twentieth century.387 Only today is computer technology beginning to
make such a "global database" possible, although there are still formidable
problems with making national and regional databases technically
compatible. Latent print examiners' flawed argument that, in the course of
filing and searching fingerprint records, they had never come across two
identical prints, was always based on searches of local databases. Since a
truly global search was impractical, fingerprint examiners extrapolated from
the absence of duplicates in local databases the much broader principle that,
were one to search all the world's databases, one would not find duplicates
either. Today, functionally global searches are becoming practicable in
high profile cases (such as an alleged Al Queda terrorist attack on European
soil). Given the nature of the case and the rapidly advancing technology,
the Madrid print may have been one of the most extensively searched latent
prints of all time. It may be that the Mayfield case demonstrates what may
happen when one actually does a global search: one finds very similar,
383 Posting of Mike, mike98070@yahoo.com, to CLPEX Message Board (Sep. 11,
2004), at http://www.clpex.com/board/threads/2004-Sep- 11/2200/2200.htm.
384 See Stacey, supra note 47, at 717.
385 FBI Press Release, supra note 4.
386 In DNA parlance, an "adventitious cold hit" is an adventitious match generated by a
database search. Again, the analogy is not exact. See infra Part III.C.3.a.
387 COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra note 69, at 219.
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though not completely identical, areas of friction ridge skin.88 This is
analogous to a phenomenon long observed by DNA analysts: as the size of
the databases increases, the likelihood of an adventitious cold hit increases
as well.389
Oddly enough, what makes the natural confounding hypothesis seem
less plausible are precisely the misleading "suspicious facts" about
Mayfield: his conversion to Islam, his Egyptian spouse, his military service,
and his connection to the "Portland Seven." If the Mayfield error were
purely an adventitious cold hit-a case of a computer searching for the
closest possible match to a latent print created by Daoud and then gulling
the examiner into making a misattribution-what is the likelihood that the
victim of the adventitious cold hit would be an individual with such
seemingly plausible connections to an Al Qaeda operation, as opposed to
say an octogenarian evangelical Christian with a criminal record? This
suggests that the "suspicious facts" about Mayfield may have been
introduced into the latent print identification process at some point, at least
"firming up," if not actually generating, the misattribution.3 90 If facts about
Mayfield did influence latent print examiners, then it was a highly improper
introduction of "domain-irrelevant information, 391 into what should have
been a technical analysis. While it would be proper for an investigator to
use the "suspicious facts" about Mayfield to evaluate the plausibility of the
latent print match, it is highly dangerous for a forensic technician to do
SO.
39 2 But an anonymous FBI source has strenuously denied that the latent
print analysts knew anything about Mayfield before they made the
attribution.3 93
Even without domain-irrelevant information, the possibility of
unconscious bias ("observer effects") remains strong. The initial analyst,
Green, may have been induced to seek the best possible match among those
produced by the database search. The "verifiers," Wieners and Massey,
may have been unconsciously influenced by the fact that Green has made an
attribution. Then Moses, who did know the domain-irrelevant information,
but whose bias ought to have pointed away from attribution, also
corroborated the false attribution.394
388 Wertheimp~re acknowledges this concern. Kramer, supra note 3.
389 David J. Balding, Errors and Misunderstandings in the Second NRC Report, 37
JURIMETRICS 469, 470-71 (1997).
390 Indeed, even Wertheimpre has endorsed this hypothesis. See Kramer, supra note 3.
391 Risinger et al., supra note 373, at 31.
392 Id. at 28.
393 Kershaw & Lichtblau, supra note 37.
394 A final point to be made is the way that these two possible causes of error may
interact: the way in which computer databases may, in fact, facilitate observer effects. In the
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Even in the face of the Mayfield case, the fingerprint community
continues to seek to minimize the significance of error. Wertheim pore, for
example, advised his colleagues to give the following testimony when
asked about the Mayfield case:
A: (turning to the jury) The FBI fingerprint section was formed in 1925. Over the last
79 years, the FBI has made tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, probably
millions of correct identifications. So now they finally made a mistake that led to the
arrest of an innocent man, and that is truly a tragic thing. But figure the "error rate"
here. Are fingerprints reliable? Of course they are. Can mistakes be made? Yes, if
proper procedures are not strictly followed. But I cannot think of any other field of
human endeavor with a track record of only one mistake in 79 years of practice.
395
To interpret Mayfield as showing that the FBI has made only one error
in seventy-nine years, as opposed to only having had one error exposed in
seventy-nine years, exhibits a complete denial of the exposure problem
detailed above (supra Part II.A.4.c).
era before the introduction of computer databases with rapid database-searching capabilities,
latent print analysis could be roughly divided into two types:
" Those rare cases in which no suspect was identified, and the case was serious
enough that the agency could justify assigning an examiner to undertake a "cold
manual search" of the entire fingerprint database (or a portion thereof).
" Those cases in which the examiner would be presented with a limited list of
possible suspects who had been identified as suspects by other means. Such a
situation presents a potential for biasing, of course; the analyst may unconsciously
be tempted to think that one of the suspects did the crime and become convinced
that the closest available match is indeed the source of the print. But, in many
cases, this biasing may have led to a conclusion that was, in fact, correct. In a
large number of cases, one of suspects may well have done the crime, and,
therefore, the number of misattributions may have been relatively limited.
Today, the situation is quite different. Computer-assisted database searching may be
undertaken in the most routine of cases. In a computer-assisted search, the human examiner
is in some sense being presented with the most potentially confounding prints the computer
can find. This may be highly dangerous if the examiner tends to pick the best available
match, raising the possibility of a misattribution. If this is true, and latent print examiners
are working blindly, we should expect some of these false attributions to generate
implausible suspects. This may or may not be occurring; we have no way of knowing.
Imagine, for example, that the FBI examiners, instead of identifying Mayfield, had identified
an implausible suspect. Would we (the public) ever have learned about the misattribution?
Presumably, the latent print examiners could have been quietly informed that they had
identified an implausible suspect and the entire false attribution quietly swept under the rug,
with no consequences for anyone. How often this occurs is anyone's guess, but information
about it would be highly relevant to estimating the error rate of latent print identification.





As I have argued elsewhere, the myth of the infallibility of fingerprint
identification is in many ways a historical accident.396 I suggest, with lain
McKie, that it is a burden that fingerprint examiners never ought to have
been asked to shoulder and never ought to have assumed.397 Unable to
resist the offer of infallible expert witness status, fingerprint examiners have
now painted themselves into a comer in which they must resort to rhetorical
gymnastics in order to maintain the claim of infallibility in the face of
mounting evidence of error. We can help them out of this comer and give
finders of fact a more realistic way of assessing the trustworthiness of latent
print attribution, but the examiners will have to leave the "zero
methodological error rate" behind.
We need to acknowledge that latent print identification is susceptible
to error, like any other method of source attribution, and begin to confront
and seek to understand its sources of error. I have drawn some tentative
conclusions in this paper based on what is probably a very inadequate data
set of exposed errors in the public record. Some of these conclusions may
not be sustained once a more complete data set is obtained. One way to
begin the process of studying error would be for law enforcement agencies
and the professional forensic science community to begin assembling a
more complete data set of latent print errors. In addition, the IAI should put
in place a regular mechanism for reviewing cases of disputed
identifications, as was done in Jackson. This mechanism should be known
and publicized without the hesitation that it will expose the fact that latent
print attributions are sometimes erroneous. Then latent print error will no
longer be "a wispy thing like smoke.,
39 8
396 See Cole, Witnessing Identification, supra note 65.
397 lain A. J. McKie, Fingerprints in Print - An Opportunity Missed?, 175 WEEKLY
DETAIL, Dec, 19, 2004, at http://www.clpex.com/Articles/TheDetail/100-199/TheDetail175.
htm ("Infallibility has turned out to be a curse for fingerprint examiners.").
398 Supra note 304 and accompanying text.
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No. Name of victim of Year of Jurisdiction Crime # of examiners
misidentification exposure implicated in
misattribution
1. Robert Loomis 1920 Pennsylvania Murder 2
2. William Stevens 1926 New Jersey Murder 3
3. John Stoppelli 1948 California Narcotics 1
4. Roger Caldwell 1982 Minnesota Murder 3
5. Anonymous 1984 Midwest ? 1
6. Michael Cooper 1986 Arizona Rape ? 2
7. Bruce Basden 1987 North Murder > 1
Carolina
8. Maurice Gaining 1988 North Burglary > 1
Carolina
9. Joseph Hammock 1988 North Larceny > 1
Carolina
10. Darian Carter 1988 North Larceny > 1
Carolina
11. Neville Lee 1991 England Rape > 1
12. Martin Blake 1994 Illinois Murder 1
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Table 1 (continued)
Fingerprint Misattributions
# of claimed Consequence of Method of exposure Exposed during
corresponding ridge misidentification normal course of
characteristics criminal justice?
? Convicted New trial No
? Acquitted Review by defense Yes
experts
14 Convicted; served two Special appeal by No
years prosecutor to
reexamine evidence
11 Convicted; served Trial of co- No
approximately three conspirator
years
14 Suspect held Independent review Yes
12 Illegally interrogated; Reexamination Yes
identified publicly as
suspect








Convicted; sentenced FBI reappraisal of No
to ten years Fayetteville
laboratory's work
product
Convicted; sentenced FBI reappraisal of No
to ten years Fayetteville
laboratory's work
product
16 Jailed; assaulted in Confession by No
jail; home wrecked by someone else
vigilantes
Questioned for three Review by other Yes
days law enforcement
agencies
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Table 1 (continued)
Fingerprint Misattributions
No. Name of victim of Year of Jurisdiction Crime # of examiners
misidentification exposure implicated in
misattribution
13. Andrew Chiory 1997 England Burglary 3
14. Danny McNamee 1998 England Terrorist 2
bombing;
murder




16. Richard Jackson 1999 Pennsylvania Murder 3
17. Anonymous 2000 England 3
("Manchester")
18. David Asbury 2002 Scotland Murder 4
19. Kathleen Hatfield 2002 Nevada Murder
investiga-
tion
20. David Valken- 2003 Utah Murder 1
Leduc
21. Stephan Cowans 2004 Massachu- Attempted 4
setts murder
22. Brandon Mayfield 2004 United States Terrorist 4
(FBI) bombing
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Table 1 (continued)
Fingerprint Misattributions
# of claimed Consequence of Method of exposure Exposed during
corresponding ridge misidentification normal course of
characteristics criminal justice?
16 Charged ? ?
11 Convicted; served Appeal of No
eleven years conviction




Convicted; served two Testimony of Yes
years of life sentence defense experts
Vernon McCloud,
George Wynn
16? None Suspect had alibi; ?
suspect did not
match description
16 Convicted; served McKie case; review No
five years by defense experts
Pat Wertheim,
Allan Bayle
? Daughter notified that Reexamination of No
mother is deceased; evidence
error exposed very
near to date of funeral
? Charged Review in No
preparation for trial
16 Exonerated after DNA exclusion No
serving six years
15 Held for two weeks as Identification of No
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Table 2
Frequency of fingerprinting for death-rla ffenses versus other offenses
n of total cases n fingerprint % total cases
Offense (N =2857) evidence with fingerprint
(N = 504) evidence
Homicide and other death 98 39.5
investigations 2
All other offenses 409 15.5
(excluding homicide) 2634
Burglary 699 168 24.0
Rape 196 46 23.5
Source: Joseph L. Peterson et al., Forensic Evidence and the Police,
1976-1980, National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research, Study No. 8186, (1985).
Table 3
Percent of evidence cases that include biological evidence with either hair
or fingerprint evidence (N = 1713)
Evidence type n Cases that include % cases that include
biological evidence* biological evidence
Hair 155 133 85.8%
Fingerprint 504 144 28.5%
* Biological evidence includes blood, perspiration, saliva, urine, vaginal,
and feces.
Source. Joseph L. Peterson et al., Forensic Evidence and the Police,
1976-1980, National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, Inter-University
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Totals 13723 341 43973 373
Sources: Peterson, Joseph L., and Penelope N. Markham. "Crime
Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, 1978-1991, II: Resolving
Questions of Common Origin." Journal of Forensic Sciences 40, no. 6
(1995): 1009-29; Collaborative Testing Services, Collaborative Testing
Services, Inc., Latent Prints Examination Report Nos. 9508, 9608, 9708,
9808, 99-516, 01-516, 02-516, 02-517, 03-516 (1995-2003), summaries or
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Table 4 (continued)
False Positive Results on All Reported External Proficiency Tests
Test # Comparison # of test takers making Examiner Habers'
false positive > 1 false positive false "consensus"
rate positive false positive
rate rate
83-4 2.6% NR NR 16.1%
84-5 3.7% NR NR 19.3%
85-7 0.6% NR NR 8.0%
86-7 1.1% NR NR 10.6%
87-7 1.9% NR NR 13.9%
88-7 0.3% NR NR 5.2%
89-7 0.8% NR NR 9.0%
90-7 1.1% NR NR 10.5%
91-8 4.4% NR NR 21.0%
93H 0.2% 6 5.8% 4.6%
9408 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
9508 4.4% 34 21.8% 21.0%
9608 1.0% 14c 7.6% 9.9%
9708 1.2% 21c 10.3% 10.8%
9808 0.9% 14 6.4% 9.3%
99-516 0.6% 14c 6.1% 7.6%
00-516 0.5% 11 4.0% 6.8%
01-516 0.3% 8 2.7% 5.5%
01-517 0.2% 2 1.7% 3.9%
02-516 0.5% 13 4.3% 6.7%
02-518 d  0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
02-517 0.5% 5 3.4% 6.9%
03-516 0.1% 4 1.2% 3.9%
03-518 d  0.6% 2 7.1% 7.7%
03-517 0.1% 1 0.5% 2.4%
04-516 0.4% 12 3.9% 6.2%
Totals 0.8% 161 5.5% 9.2%
complete reports on file with the author, reports from 2001-2003 available
at http://www.collaborativetesting.com/forensics/forensics reports.html
(last visited June 2, 2004); Kenneth 0. Smith, Latent Prints Proficiency
Test Comparison Study (Feb. 8, 2002), submitted into evidence in United
States v. Llera Plaza as Government Exhibit R-1, on file with the author;
Catherine Brown, Forensic Program Manger, Collaborative Testing
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Services, Inc., electronic communication, Aug. 27, 2004, on file with the
author.
a It is not entirely clear how to derive a false positive rate from
Peterson & Markham's presentation of the data for 1983-1991. Peterson &
Markham are often reported (e.g., Haber & Haber, supra note 257) as
having found an overall false positive rate of 2%. This number derives from
Peterson & Markham's Table 2, column 8, which indicates the number of
false attributions of prints for which a true matching print was not provided
(target-absent false positive). This figure does not appear to include cases
in which a true matching print was provided, but the examiner still made an
incorrect attribution (target-present false positive) to some other print. This
figure appears to be given in Peterson & Markham's column 10. My "false
positive" count represents the sum of these two types of error and is
therefore greater than the false positive count generally reported from these
tests. Peterson & Markham included another column (column 9) that
represents cases in which target-present false positives were made by
attributing a print to the wrong card (as opposed to column 10, which
indicates attributions to the right card but the wrong finger). In the interest
of conservatism, I have not included these cases because it was impossible
to determine whether or not these cases were also included in the cases in
column 10. If not, then I have undercounted false positives. Ambiguities
like this emphasize that the error rates presented here should be treated only
as estimates.
b In all other cases, I have calculated the number of comparisons as the
product of the number of test items and the number of test-takers. Peterson
& Markham's report of the number of comparisons (which should be the
sum of the denominators in columns 5 and 6) corresponds pretty closely
with product of the number of test items and the number of test-takers.
(Slight discrepancies presumably derive from laboratories advertently or
inadvertently skipping test items.) From 1989 through 1991, however, this
correspondence breaks down significantly by up to almost a factor of 2. I
have been unable to explain the discrepancy. In the interest of being
conservative, I have used the higher figure for the number of comparisons
for these three years. However, if the lower figure is correct, then I have
overcounted comparisons and underestimated the false positive rate for
these years and overall.
C For some tests, there is a discrepancy between the number of
"erroneous identifications" reported by Smith and those reported in the
"PAC [Proficiency Advisory Committee] Comments" reported at the
beginning of the Summary Report of each CTS test. In all cases, Smith
reported more false positives than the PAC. The one test containing
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discrepancies for which I had access to the complete test (rather than just
the Summary Report) was Test No. 99-516. I did a manual count of the
number of false positives, which confirmed Smith's report that 16
erroneous identifications were made by 14 examiners. But the PAC
Comments state, "Eleven erroneous identifications were reported by nine
participants." That the PAC has underreported false positives is disturbing
because for some tests (9608, 9708, 9808) I have been able to obtain only
the summary sheets, rather than the complete test results. (Although the
most recent tests are published on the internet, older tests may be obtained
only through subpoena.) Thus, I have been forced to rely upon the PAC
Comments to give the number of false positives. Because Smith's numbers
were accurate on Test No. 99-516, I have used them whenever they differ
from the PAC numbers.




Results oflnternal FBI Pro flincvTestin. 1995-2001
1995 61 11 42 404 124,644 0 2 2
1996 63 7 20 140 8,820 0 0 0
1997 60 8 20 160 9,600 0 0 0
1998 69 13 33 270 18,630 0 0 0
1999 68 10 32 222 15,096 0 0 0
2000 57 10 33 204 11,628 0 1 1
2001 53 10 33 0812 0 0 0
Total 431 69 213 1604 99,230 0 3 3
Source: FBI Laboratory Latent Print Unit, Assessment of Proficiency
Tests by the FBI Latent Print Units, 1995-2001, submitted into evidence in
United States v. Llera Plaza, Cr. No. 98-362 (E.D. Pa. 2002), on file with
tal 431hor. 69 213 1604 99,230 90 -3
the author.
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Figure 1
Exposed United States and United Kingdom Fingerprint Misattributions,
1920-2004
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Figure 2
Known Misattributions by Offense
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Figure 3
Known Misattributions by Offense with Unknown Cases Removed
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